

Way Science



International Scientific
and Practical Internet Conference

«Russia-Ukraine War: Consequences for the World»
ISBN 978-617-95229-3-2



International Scientific
and Practical Internet Conference

«Russia-Ukraine War: Consequences for the World»
ISBN 978-617-95229-3-2

Editorial board of International Electronic Scientific and Practical Journal «WayScience»
(ISSN 2664-4819 (Online))

The editorial board of the Journal is not responsible for the content of the papers and may not share the author's opinion.

Russia-Ukraine War: Consequences for the World: Proceedings of the International Scientific and Practical Internet Conference, April 28-29, 2022. FOP Marenichenko V.V., Dnipro, Ukraine, 62 p.

ISBN 978-617-95229-3-2

International Scientific and Practical Internet Conference "Russia-Ukraine War: Consequences for the World" devoted to the impact of russian aggression on the global security of the world.

Topics cover all sections of the International Electronic Scientific and Practical Journal "WayScience", namely:

- public administration sciences;
- philosophical sciences;
- economic sciences;
- historical sciences;
- legal sciences;
- agricultural sciences;
- geographic sciences;
- pedagogical sciences;
- psychological sciences;
- sociological sciences;
- political sciences;
- philological sciences;
- technical sciences;
- medical sciences;
- chemical sciences;
- biological sciences;
- physical and mathematical sciences;
- other professional sciences.

Dnipro, Ukraine – 2022

FROM RED TO GREEN ECONOMY - TOWARDS A FREE AND POWERFUL EUROPE ENERGETICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY

Ailincă Alina Georgeta

3rd degree researcher, Centre for Financial and Monetary Research
“Victor Slăvescu”, NIER, RA, Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: alinageorgetaailinca@gmail.com

Abstract. Although often categorized as war, although it is simply an invasion and a brutal violation of any international law, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict brings to light a decapitalization not only of people, land, but also of Europe's resources and money. The danger of stagflation hovers over the Europe and especially EU, and the transition from the brown economy to the green economy seems to be going through the red economy - weapons funds and massive human losses. Thus, the article highlights on the one hand, the EU's inability to achieve the energy independence claimed so far, and on the other hand, the consequences of not implementing the European Green Pact and adequate public defense policies.

Keywords: war, consequences, European Union 27, transition to green energy, European economic destiny

Classification JEL: H56, E66, G14

1. Introduction

February 24 is not only a tragic day for Ukraine, but also a shame for the whole world and especially for Europe, for the EU but also for the free and democratic world, in general. Not long ago walls fell - the Cold War, the Berlin Wall (33 years ago!). Now seem to be erected new ones much more harmful than those mentioned in recent history. The conflict so far, and for the close future, seems to have only losers - the citizens of Ukraine, the citizens of Europe, sanctions being rather a coercive mechanism with a delayed or diluted effect, with many elements that can lead to success or failure (Smeets, 1990; Drezner, 1999; van Bergeijk and van Marrewijk, 1995; Hufbauer et al. 2008; Oegg and Elliott, 2008; Shahadat and van Bergeijk, 2012 etc.). Thus, the article reviews a series of effects or consequences of the conflict emphasizing that the long-term consequences are much more serious and deeper than what can be seen in the first phase. Therefore, the paper strengthens the idea that the transition to the green economy and compliance with the provisions of the European Green Deal should be a priority for the EU, and the fight for freedom and democracy should be the goal of Europe and the whole civilized Western world.

2. Literature review

The literature highlights a number of effects of the war, but of course, as things go on unfortunately, the literature is still unable to capture all the (negative) aspects of the phenomenon. Regarding sanctions, although the literature emphasizes a number of war contingency mechanisms and that there are many conflicting opinions, however there are the opinions and studies that demonstrate the effects of sanctions on the sanctioned states and on the economic relationships between the senders and the targets, and that those effects are significant (Bělin and Hanousek 2019; Felbermayr et al. 202; Kwon, Syropoulos, and Yotov, 2022 etc).

3. Methodology

The paper reviews the effects of war underlined by the literature and the effectiveness or effectiveness of sanctions and clearly points out delays in implementing the European Green Deal, which has the effect of using red energy (on the grounds of significant human and fixed capital losses of Ukraine) rather than the green energy in the EU. Thus, in short, there are presented a series of immediate, visible, underlined effects (which are stated by the literature as well), but also

some of lasting duration effects of the war, still imperceptible, but which will be able to be seen in the medium and long time horizon.

4. Results

The effects of the war are still evolving, and can be systematized according to several criteria. If we refer to the division into categories of "recipients" we can notice a number of recipients by levels: Ukraine, Russia, EU, World.

Consequences for Ukraine:

- thousands civilians wounded or killed, about 5 million people, mostly women and children, fled Ukraine, and a further 7 million are estimated to be displaced internally (IMF, 2022a),
- GDP is projected to contract by about 35 percent in 2022 in Ukraine, on the grounds of destruction of social and economic infrastructure, large outward migration, the sharply reduced productive capacity of the country (IMF, 2022a),
- Social and economic infrastructure destroyed by the war will need to be rebuilt with the support of large financing flows from donors (IMF, 2022a),
- In the context of a victory, the territoriality of Ukraine will not be affected or will be very little affected and the interantional relations formed during this period will be able to lead to a rapid post-war reconstruction in the next 5 years.

Consequences for Russia:

- GDP growth is projected to plummet to –8.5 percent in 2022, on the grounds of a decline in export volumes, coupled with a decline in domestic demand and with the deteriorations of the current account (reflecting higher prices for energy exports and lower imports). In the medium-term, energy exports could fall to US\$250 billion or below as the EU reduces its energy imports from Russia. Aso, the inflation is projected to exceed 20 percent in 2022 and the overall fiscal deficit is projected to increase to 4.2 percent of GDP from a surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP in 2021(IMF, 2022a). So, the close future will be marked by inflation, volatile exchange rate and economic contraction, the ruble losing 32% of its value since the beginning of the year, and 72% since the annexation of Crimea (Chaney, 2022),
- Financial exclusion, amid the partial embargo on US and European imports, the strongest impact in the medium term being fixed capital and technology imports,
- In case of losing the war, impressive war reparations, significant human and technological losses, restructuring the political regime and the Kremlin's poles of power
- Russia will have to deal with limiting exports to the EU, knowing that 60-70% of gas supply was offered to the EU, so it will have to look for new markets with higher delivery costs and lower prices, given the impossibility of other countries to offer the European competitive price on gas and oil. There will also be almost inevitable contractions of the supply and massive unemployment. Thus, the restructuring of the energy mechanism with massive losses for industry and population (important job losses) is expected (the transition to the green economy will take place finally also in Russia in the horizon of 5-10 years due to the growing need for cheap and clean energy).

Consequences for the EU:

- On short term, inflation in 2022 is now projected to reach 5.5 and 9.1 percent in advanced and emerging European economies, there is expected the increase the number of refugees fleeing to Europe, compound supply-chain bottlenecks, and deepen output losses (IMF, 2022a). In 2021, IMF (2022a) stated that advanced and emerging European economies grew by 5.6 and 6.7 percent, regaining a large part of the 2020 GDP losses. According to IMF (2022a): "Europe's policymakers the main challenges are clear: caring for the refugees; helping vulnerable households and firms cope with higher spending on energy; beefing up energy security; and, in concert with social partners, ensuring that wage and price expectations remain well anchored." Thus, the combined effect of rising inflation and precarious economic developments will most likely be stagflation (e.g. Chaney, 2022),

- The main issues of European economy are related to the sudden stop of flows of energy and the higher food and energy prices on the ground of difficulties in supplying agricultural and related products from war-torn areas,

- Fiscal policies of EU and Euro Area are likely to lead to fiscal easing and therefore higher public spending amid sustained efforts to increase the EU's energy, economic and military independence. The EU should take into account the design of effective strategies and to put them into practice, for real, not only on paper. Thus, the energy release from other countries or territories outside the EU, the achievement of energy independence should be the main goal,

- Strengthening the EU's eastern flank, creating an EU army, creating much better articulated armed mechanisms than in the past, beyond NATO forces. In fact, the EU needs to build two concentric security barriers, one to protect the eurozone and another, much more important, with a better-reinforced structure as the EU's external border barrier,

- Receiving new members in the EU and reconfiguring the euro area, so as to provide a good absorption of the EU's economic and social problems. The answer to some of the problems mentioned above may be the solution for the others as well (e.g. energy independence also offers economic independence, economic independence also gives decisional and political independence, etc.), so the policies must be set by Brussels so that "with a stone" to "knock down" more problems,

- Better compliance with international environmental treaties and accelerating the transition to the green economy, accelerating the implementation of the European Green Deal. What has been delayed, not done or done badly in the past needs to be corrected and the pace of transition to green economy and energy independence needs to be increased rapidly,

Consequences for the whole world:

- On short term, global growth is projected to slow to 3.6 percent in 2022 and 2023, with a declining trend after 2023 on medium term. War-induced commodity price increases and broadening price pressures have led to 2022 inflation projections of 5.7 percent in advanced economies and 8.7 percent in emerging market and developing economies (IMF, 2022b).

- Restructuring the global energy mechanism and the real transition to a green economy (e.g. taxes and duties for those who will continue with the current regime of brown energy use - coal, natural gas, oil, etc.)

- Effective mechanisms for transfers of funds and careful social policies for targeting the categories of people with low incomes, unemployed, disadvantaged, etc.

- Social and political mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts and economic shocks - economic and social buffers at national and regional level,

- An efficient system of financial concessions and extensive financial and humanitarian assistance for areas affected by war or natural cataclysms (beyond World Bank funds, the IMF, the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Commission etc.)

5. Conclusions

The natural course of things has taken us through the centuries through a series of industrial revolutions, to change the very paradigms of how things work. The phenomenon will continue even now, regardless of who or how stands in its way. Thus, the transition to the green economy, with or without permission, will take place around the world in the near future. Therefore, public policies and policy decisions have proven their effects over time, regardless of how they were presented by those who have brought them to the forefront. Thus, an outdated economy, no matter how good it looks today, tomorrow it will be naturally forced to function only within the limits of certain parameters: economic, social, political, ecological, etc. That is why the Russian-Ukrainian war brings to light a real struggle between civilizations, between old and new, between good and evil, between efficient and inefficient economic in the medium and long term. The brown or red economy will not last long, it will have to be stopped and restructured on other bases, in line with the level of civilization we all want, and this is happening and will happen before our eyes.

References:

1. Bělin, M and J Hanousek, 2019. "Making sanctions bite: The EU–Russian sanctions of 2014", VoxEU.org, 29 April.
 2. Chaney, 2022. Institute Montaigne Interview - Ukraine's War: The Economic Impacts Three questions to Eric Chaney. 29 MARCH 2022. Online: <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/ukraines-war-economic-impacts>.
 3. Drezner, Daniel, 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
 4. Felbermayr, G, A Kirilakha, C Syropoulos, E Yalcin, and Y V Yotov, 2021. "The 'Global Sanctions Data Base': Mapping international sanction policies from 1950-2019", VoxEU.org, 18 May.
 5. Hufbauer, G.C., J .J. Schott, K. A. Elliott, and B. Oegg (2008). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
 6. International Monetary Fund (2022a). Regional Economic Outlook War Sets Back the European Recovery, 2022, Apr.
 7. International Monetary Fund (2022b). Online: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/04/19/world-economic-outlook-april-2022>;
 8. Kwon, Ohyun, Syropoulos, Constantinos and Yotov, Yoto, 2022. Extraterritorial sanctions: A stick and a carrot, 04 March. Online: <https://voxeu.org/article/extraterritorial-sanctions-stick-and-carrot>.
 9. Oegg, Barbara and Kimberly Elliott, 2008. The futility of using economic sanctions against Russia. Online> <https://voxeu.org/article/futility-using-economic-sanctions-against-russia>.
 10. Smeets, M., 1990. "Economic Sanctions Against Iraq: The Ideal Case?" Journal of World Trade, 24(6):105–20.
 11. Shahadat Hossain Siddiquee, M. and P. A. G. van Bergeijk, 2012. "Reconsidering Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Detailed Analysis of the Peterson Institute Sanction Database", ISS Working paper, Erasmus University: Rotterdam.
 12. van Bergeijk, P .A. G and C. van Marrewijk (1995). "Why Do Sanctions Need Time to Work?, Adjustment, Learning and Anticipation", Economic Modelling, 12(2): 75–86.
- *** https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_ro.
- ***[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729327/EPRS_BRI\(2022\)729327_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729327/EPRS_BRI(2022)729327_EN.pdf).

THE ISSUE OF SECURITY AND ITS RUSSIAN MISINTERPRETATION

Berényi Zoltán

Ph.D.

zoltan.berenyi@icloud.com

University of Debrecen, Hungary

In this short paper would like to discuss security, the understanding of security, the good and bad interpretation of that notion and the consequences of these interpretations.

I am sure that many people who followed the news even remotely before the Russian invasion of Ukraine had the opportunity to either hear or read the argument that Russia has legitimate security requirements and the world must respect them. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin himself has said on several occasions that NATO has duped them and the idea of having a potential NATO base near Harkiv is completely unacceptable for Russia (TASS, 2022).

A precursor of that argument has already appeared during Putin's previous presidency when he protested against the establishment of missile bases in Romania, and potentially other ones in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the US government always emphasized that these are solely for hosting anti-ballistic missiles that would serve as a defense against missiles launched at Europe by North Korea or Iran, Russia was adamant to point out every time that these could be also be used to launch Tomahawk missiles armed with nuclear warheads as well. Consequently they argued that these pose a threat to Russia and the existence of these missile sites is unacceptable for them, because they are "*too close to Russia*".

Thus, we can see that the argument that the presence of NATO bases near Russian borders is unacceptable for Russia was used well before it popped out in the Ukrainian context.

What can we say about that? Well, at first sight it appears to be a legitimate concern. After all, military bases could indeed be used for the concentration of troops, military hardware and could facilitate aggressive maneuvers, could provide a strategic advantage for an attack. No doubt about that. And so, if we assume that military bases could be used for the preparation and indeed the launch of attack maneuvers, the argument that the presence of a military base in any country constitutes a serious threat to its neighbors seems to be perfectly legitimate.

The Russian government, Russian politicians used that narrative many times and it seems that many people bought their argument and were duped by that. Politicians, political scientists, ordinary people - especially when watching the press conferences where Vladimir Putin presented these arguments many times - believed that these are indeed legitimate security concerns of Russia and these must be respected somehow. Perhaps John Mearsheimer is one of the most highly esteemed American political scientists who convincingly argued already in 2014 that, in fact, Western democratic states are to be blamed for the Ukrainian security crisis, and these security concerns of Russia must be respected (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Others, however questioned the validity of this argument. Among them were members of the US security community and US politicians who pointed out numerous times that they have no intention to attack Russia and NATO has no such intention either. Russian politicians, the Russian government and most notably the Russian president however, always dismissed these arguments and stated that they simply do not believe that. The also emphasized on several occasions that NATO is an aggressive organization.

However, I would argue that the recent events since February 2022 has revealed that in fact, the Russian argument that their legitimate security interests are threatened by neighboring NATO countries and the military relations between Ukraine and NATO has no real base and this narrative is nothing more than a pretext for Russia to justify her aggressive, imperialistic policy.

Why do I say that?

Well, first, we have to look at the way that Russia relates to other countries, and especially her neighbors. While in every possible occasion Russia emphasized that they have legitimate security interest, it completely ignored the reciprocity of that. They have not neither cared about the legitimate security concerns of Georgia, the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, etc. Have they not done that, they would at least offered the removal of Russian military bases from the Russian border regions from the Kaliningrad enclave. When they moved several times more than a hundred thousand Russian troops - allegedly for the purpose of “training and for maintaining the level of their combat readiness” they always claimed that they have a right to move as many of those troops and in any direction within Russia they please. That may be so, but when NATO did that in the territory of NATO countries, (and moving much fewer troops and equipment than Russia), Russian state officials always protested about the “*aggressive movements of NATO troops*”.

So, to say the least, reciprocity and mutual acceptance of legitimate security interests of other countries than Russia has never been the strength of Russian security and foreign policy. In short, when it comes to regional or global security issues they have not, in reality seem to accept the principle of reciprocity and mutuality.

Arriving at this point in the examination of how Russian elites approach the issue of security, I believe that there is an aspect that should also be discussed.

It seems that Russian arguments about the dangerous nature of military bases near their borders, and their argument that these are totally intolerable, unacceptable and Russia has to - to use their words - “*take a military-technical measures to tackle them*” (and since February, 2022 we know what do they mean by that) has fundamental flaws.

What are these flaws?

Well, first of all somehow they either have not seemed to realize that alongside the several thousand kilometers long borders of Russia there are indeed military bases of quite a lot of countries, or they seem to be unconcerned about it. Just to name a few of these countries: Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, North Korea, and most notably, China. There could be no doubt that among these countries it is China that has a military capacity to pose a serious threat to Russia. And yet, the Russian political leadership seems to be totally unconcerned about that. They do not claim that China should remove Chinese military bases from the vicinity of Russian border regions, they do not demand that Chinese troops should not be stationed there, etc. Why is that? Is it perhaps because Russia has “*legitimate security concerns*” only in the European part of Russia?

I recently came across an argument presented in the Russian state television that the US would not tolerate military bases in the close proximity of their border regions either.

Well, one just has to point out that in fact, Canada has military bases on its side of the border with the US, and Mexico also has those and yet, it seems that the US security community does not see that as a threat (Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998). What is more, subsequent US state administrations had no intention to invade Mexico and Canada to “*take military-technical measures to tackle this problem*”. Thus, either US the political leadership does not see it as a threat to US national security, or they have not noticed the existence of those military bases yet. Needless to say, it is probably not because Canadian and Mexican army bases are invisible and undetectable, but because these are simply not regarded by the US state administration, or American politicians to pose a threat to the security of the US.

What is the reason of that? Is it a phenomenon that only occurs in the North American continent? Or we could also discover this phenomenon in other continents as well?

Well, if we look to other continents we find something very similar. Australians do not see American bases, American ships as a threat to the security of Australia, and to name a few more countries in Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan does not see that either (Haas, 1986). And besides

these countries, it is also true in the case of countries situated at the Central, Northern, Southern and Western parts of Europe. I have failed to dig up even one serious protest of the Danish, Swedish, Finnish, Polish, Czech, Swiss or Austrian governments over the presence of American military bases in Germany, because of their alleged threat to the national security of these countries.

Why is that?

One could of course argue that it is because these are NATO countries, but while it is true for most of them, it is certainly not in the case of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland.

Thus, there must be another reason behind it.

The idea of security community

What is that reason?

This reason is the phenomenon first described by Karl Deutsch (Deutsch et. al., 1957). More than quarter of a century ago he coined the term “security community”. By that Deutsch meant that the real and ultimate basis of shared security of countries lies in their shared values and norms. He claimed that countries respecting the same values, upholding the same norms - and among them, most notably the value of freedom - will not pose a threat to one another’s security, and to secure peace between them they do not even have to have a written security pact between them, or they do not even have to establish a common institutional framework to protect their security (Deutsch, 1961).

I believe that it is only by looking at the case of Russian security and the whole issue of security through these lenses we can finally see what is the actual problem. Simply put, it is that Russia does not respect the same values, norms, than other countries having a democratic political system.

Due to that, Russia employs a pathologically distorted understanding of the notion of security. It does so, because it fails to comprehend that the security of Russia must originate from inside Russia. It will never be “secure” from “outside threats” if it’s notions, narratives, interpretation of the history of Russia etc. are distorted, most notably due to their disrespect of the value of human freedom. Not only that the current regime in Russia does not respect the freedom of other countries, it does not recognize the right of making a free choice of its own citizens. Not only that they do not see freedom to be an inalienable right of human beings they do not value human life at all.

Among many things - the war showed us that the highest level of security is a security community - something that is understood in the sense that Karl Deutsch has understood that. That is, it is the shared democratic norms and values that are the fundamental base of security (Tusicsny, 2007). However, as the war showed the world, the majority of Russian society have fundamentally different values than the West. That is what is behind the behavior of Russia and that is what the democratic world needs to understand.

Sadly, the imperialistic war of Russia against Ukraine also made it evidently clear that security guarantees could only work, when these are built upon shared values between countries. It is precisely for that reason that the Budapest memorandum about the security of Ukraine has not been respected. That is one thing among many that the Russian invasion of Ukraine showed to the world. It became clearly evident that a security contract with a country that does not share the same values and norms has no binding power at all.

Thus, we can only conclude that Russian elites and Russian society nurture a fundamental misunderstanding of security. They seem to be convinced that the security of Russia is primarily threatened by forces *outside* Russia and thus, they must be dealt with accordingly. They appear to be unable to understand that the main threat to Russia’s security comes from *inside* Russia. That is, the greatest danger to the security of Russia is posed by the current value system and norms of

Russian society.

And they seem to be unable to understand that the Russian elites sticking to these values and norms are indeed pushing forward Russia on a road towards a complete destruction and disintegration of not only the Russian state but the Russian society as well.

I can only wish that they somehow will be capable to understand that in the near future.

The sooner is the better for not only Russia but also for the entire world.

References:

1. Deutsch, Karl W (1961). Security communities, In: Rosenau J. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: Free Press, pp. 98–105
2. Deutsch, Karl W.; et al. (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press
3. Gonzalez, Guadalupe; Stephan Haggard (1998). "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community". In: Adler, Emanuel; Michael Barnett (eds.). Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Haas, Michael (1986). Comparing Regional Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, In: Jeannette P. Mass and Robert A. C. Stewart. (eds.) Toward a World of Peace, Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific Press. pp. 149–168
5. Tusicisny, Andrej (2007). "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously". International Political Science Review. 28 (4): 425–449
6. Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin". In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 77-84, 85-89.
7. TASS (2022). "NATO 'cheated' Russia with pledges not to expand eastward, says Putin" 01.2.2022. 18.51.
https://tass.com/world/1396215?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com (retrieved: 25.04.2022.)

ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER-ATTACKS EXECUTED DURING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

Cefaliello Daniele*

University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

e-mail: da.cefaliello@gmail.com

Giacomo Genta*

University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

e-mail: giacomo.genta@icloud.com

Patrone Fabio

University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

e-mail: f.patrone@edu.unige.it

Cambiaso Enrico

Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) – IEIIT Institute, Genova, Italy

e-mail: enrico.cambiaso@cnr.it

Abstract. In the context of an ongoing conflict between two countries, the actions of organized hacktivist groups further widen the battlefield. In this document, we aim to depict a frame of the current Russia-Ukraine cyberwarfare activities, by focusing on the emerged cyber-collectives and the main performed attacks.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, cyberwarfare, cyber-collectives, hacktivism, cybersecurity.

1. Introduction

Despite the origins of this conflict may be dated back to the past few decades, the aim of this document is to provide a brief and neutral introduction concerning what has happened so far. To do that, we start with a chronological analysis of the events which began with the Russian troops' movement near the East-South Ukrainian borders, dated October 2021 [1]. During the winter months, the Russian government began moving a huge number of troops and military equipment near the Ukrainian border, a fact confirmed by several images coming from satellites or spread out by news agencies and through social media [2]. On February 24, 2022, Russia decided to officially invade the contended East Ukrainian territories, leading to a violent escalation and a consequent humanitarian crisis, enhanced by the shortage of food, water, and safe shelters for hundreds of civilians whose number is still increasing [3]. While Russian troops and Ukrainian defenders were fighting each other along the streets, several NATO countries agreed to apply a sanction policy against the Russian government, considered not efficient in stopping the conflict [4] and with unpleasant consequences also for the NATO countries, such as the increase of the gasoline and gas prices due to the increase of not Russian oil and gas demand [5].

In parallel with a war perpetrated on both the battlefield and the economic markets, a real cyber-warfare has been reaching its escalation too and it is becoming more relevant for the fate of the conflict, involving groups of hacktivists and cyber-criminals [6]. This paper aims to deepen this cyber branch of the conflict, highlighting the cyber-collectives which have emerged within and reporting the most relevant cyber-attacks perpetrated so far. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reports a list of the emerged profiles of cyber-attackers, Section 3 lists the most relevant cyber-attacks carried on so far, and Section 4 concludes the paper.

*Daniele Cefaliello and Giacomo Genta contributed equally to the work.

2. Emerged profiles

Tables 1 and 2 contain a list of cyber-collectives that have emerged during the conflict distinguished by their support and sorted by group affiliations. For each group, the category of the most relevant executed, the source of the community, and the related country are reported.

In the following, the term *Hack* is used to identify the execution of heterogenous cyber-attacks. Instead, the term APT refers to Advanced Persistent Threats [7].

Table 1: Cyber-collectives supporting Russia [8]

Group	Typical attack types	Community	Location
<i>Conti</i>	Ransomware	Onion networks	Russia
<i>cyberwar_world</i>	DDoS/Hack	Telegram	Russia
<i>DDoS Hactivist Team</i>	DDoS	Telegram	Russia
<i>DivisionZ</i>	DDoS/Hack	Telegram	Russia
<i>DragOn</i>	Hack	Twitter	Russia
<i>ECO</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>FfboyG</i>	DDoS/PsyOps	Twitter	India
<i>Free Civilian</i>	Data breach	Website	Unknown
<i>Hydra / Digital Cobra Gang</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Russia
<i>Killnet</i>	DDoS/Hack	Telegram	Russia
<i>Lorec53</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>punisher_346</i>	PsyOps	Twitter	Unknown
<i>RaHDit</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>RedBanditsRU</i>	Hack	Twitter	Russia
<i>Stormous Ransomware</i>	Ransomware	Telegram	Unknown
<i>WeretheGoons</i>	Hack	Twitter	Russia
<i>Xaknet</i>	Hack	Site	Russia
<i>Zsecnet</i>	DDoS/Hack	Telegram	Russia
<i>404 Cyber Defense</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown

Table 2: Allegedly nation supported pro-Russia cyber-collectives [9,10]

Group	Typical attack types	Community	Location
<i>DEV-0586 APT</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>DEV-0665 APT</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>FancyBear APT</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>Gamaredon</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia
<i>GhostWriter UNC1151</i>	Hack	Unknown	Belarus
<i>SandWorm</i>	Hack	Unknown	Russia

In addition, [11] reports that 14 nation-supported cyber-threats have been perpetrated, with attackers affiliated to the government or security services of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

In the same way, Tables 3 and 4 report the list of groups supporting Ukraine.

Table 3: Cyber-collectives supporting Ukraine [8]

Group	Typical attack types	Community	Location
<i>AgainstTheWest</i>	Data breach/Ransomware	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Bandera Hackers</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>BeeHive Cybersecurity</i>	Hack/Phishing	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Belarusian Cyber-Partisans</i>	Ransomware	Twitter	Belarus

<i>BlueHornetAPT49 (ATW)</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>BrazenEagle (ATW)</i>	Hack	Telegram	Unknown
<i>ContiLeaks</i>	Data breach	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Crystal_MSf</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Cyber_legion_hackers</i>	DDoS/Defacement	Twitter	Unknown
<i>GhostClan</i>	DDoS/Hack	Telegram	Unknown
<i>GNG</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Georgia
<i>HackenClub</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Ukraine
<i>Hydra UG</i>	Radio	Twitter	Unknown
<i>KelvinSecurity Hacking Team</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>M3moryK1tten</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Monarch Turkish Hacktivists</i>	Defacement	Unknown	Turkey
<i>NB65</i>	Hack/Ransomware	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Rabbit Two</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>RaidForums2</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Ring3API</i>	Hack	Twitter	Ukraine
<i>SecDet</i>	Hack	Twitter	US
<i>SecJuice</i>	OSINT/PsyOps	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Shadow_Xor</i>	Unknown	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Spot</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Stand for Ukraine</i>	DDoS/Hack	Unknown	Ukraine
<i>The Connections</i>	Unknown	Twitter	Unknown
<i>TrickLeaks</i>	Databreach	Twitter	Unknown
<i>lLevelCrew</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown

Table 4: Allegedly nation supported pro-Ukraine cyber-collectives [8]

Group	Typical attack types	Community	Location
<i>Internet Forces of Ukraine</i>	PsyOps	Unknown	Ukraine
<i>IT Army of Ukraine</i>	DDoS	Twitter, Telegram	Ukraine
<i>IT Army of Ukraine PsyOps</i>	PsyOps	Twitter	Ukraine

In addition, many different groups of hackers, often related to Anonymous, are actively executing pro-Ukraine cyber-attacks (Table 5).

Table 5: Anonymous related cyber-collectives supporting Ukraine [8]

Group	Typical attack types	Community	Location
<i>Anon Liberland & PWN-BAR</i>	DDoS/Hack	Unknown	Unknown
<i>AnonGh0st</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Anonymous</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Anonymous News</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Anonymous Romania</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Romania
<i>Anonymous Younes</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>BlackHawks</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Georgia
<i>CyberNinja Security Team</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>DDoS Secrets</i>	DDoS/Data breach	Twitter	Unknown
<i>DeepNetAnon</i>	Radio/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>DoomSec</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>GhostSec</i>	Hack	Telegram	Unknown
<i>GrenXPaRTa_9haan</i>	Data breach	Twitter	Indonesia
<i>HAL9000</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown

<i>LiteMods</i>	PsyOps/DDoS	Twitter	Unknown
<i>N3UR0515</i>	DDoS	Twitter	Unknown
<i>PuckArks</i>	PsyOps/Defacement	Twitter	Unknown
<i>ReaperSec</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>RedCult</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>RootUser</i>	Radio	Twitter	Ukraine
<i>Shadow_Xor</i>	Data breach	Twitter	Unknown
<i>SHDWSec</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Squad303</i>	DDoS/SMS spam	Twitter	Poland
<i>Synthynt/AlphaDisiak</i>	Ransomware	Twitter	Unknown
<i>v0g3lSec</i>	Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>Vest1geSec</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown
<i>YourAnonNews</i>	PsyOps	Twitter	Unknown
<i>0xAnonLeet</i>	DDoS/Hack	Twitter	Unknown

To the best of our knowledge, a total of 84 groups were found: 59 of them supporting Ukraine; 25 supporting Russia. Although this unbalanced result, many groups may still be unknown, while others may emerge in the next future. The most preferred attack type is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), highly preferred by the Ukrainian side, followed by psychological-related attacks executed through propaganda and disinformation means, usually aim to control people (PsyOps). Worth noting is the SMS spam attack executed by *Squad303*: the beginning of the attack is dated March 6, 2022, when the cyber-group started sending SMS text and WhatsApp messages to millions of Russian citizens to spread pro-Ukraine information.

So far, the most relevant activities have been carried out by *Conti* and *SandWorm* groups, on the Russian side, and *Anonymous* and *IT Army of Ukraine*, on the Ukrainian side:

- ***Conti*** is a highly sophisticated group known for being the first group to weaponize the *Log4Shell* vulnerability [12] and to operate a fully-developed attack chain to execute ransomware attacks. Days after *Conti* announced their support for Russia, an insider belonging to such a group, who is believed to be Ukrainian, leaked 400 files of internal communications between group members (ContiLeaks) [12].

- ***SandWorm*** is supposed to be a Russian cyber-military unit of the GRU, the Russian Chief Intelligence Office. They are also known as *Unit 74455*, *Telebots*, *Voodoo Bear*, and *Iron Viking*. The team is believed to be behind the Ukraine power grid cyber-attacks in December 2015, the cyber-attacks against Ukraine by using the Petya malware in 2017, attacks executed during the French presidential election in 2017, and the cyber-attack on the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in 2018 [13].

- ***Anonymous*** is a decentralized group of hacktivists which targets different government institutions, agencies, corporations, and even religious centres for different reasons, such as to fight violations of human rights [12]. They officially declared war to Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022 [14]. After that, many cyber-collectives have joined the group's flag to actively support them.

- ***IT Army of Ukraine*** is perhaps one of the largest groups supporting Ukraine, coordinating hacktivist operations [6]. It got popularity by spreading its intents through a public Telegram channel, providing information both in Ukrainian and English language. To date, most of the Ukrainian cyber-power appears to be related to such group [6].

3. Performed Attacks

Tables 6 and 7 report the most relevant and worth noting cyber-attacks executed so far referring to attacks against Ukraine or Russia, respectively.

Table 6: Selected cyber-attacks executed against Ukraine (updated to April 23, 2022)

Date	Attribution	Target	Attack Type	Description/Effects
Feb 23, 2022 [15]	Not identified China's APTs (unconfirmed)	Kyiv ministry of defence and other institutions	Thousands of distributed exploits	Exploits were implemented to steal data and explore ways to shut down or disrupt core defence and civilian infrastructures
Feb 23, 2022 [15]	Not identified Russia's APTs	Ukrainian banks and government departments	DDoS	Service interruptions for 2 hours; higher overall network latency for days
Feb 24, 2022 [15]	Unknown	<i>Kyiv Post</i> (Ukrainian newspaper)	DDoS	Website offline
Feb 24, 2022 [15]	Not identified Russia's APTs	<i>Viasat Inc's</i> KA-SAT Satellite	<i>AcidRain</i> (malware, wiper)	Satellite modems, which supplies Internet access to European countries (including Ukraine), disabled
Feb 28, 2022 [15]	Not identified Russia's APT groups (unconfirmed)	Government and financial websites	<i>Zhadnost</i> (DDoS botnet with more than 3.000 bots)	Limited downtime affecting the targeted websites
March 7, 2022 [15]	<i>GhostWriter/UNC1151</i>	Ukrainian and Polish government and military agencies	<i>MicroBackdoor</i> (malware)	Phishing campaigns sent via email
March 7, 2022 [9]	<i>FancyBear/APT28</i>	<i>UrkNet</i> (media company)	DDoS	Denial of service experienced on the targeted systems
March 9, 2022 [15]	Unknown	<i>Triolan</i> (telco provider)	Unknown	Reset computers to factory level; network issues
March 14, 2022 [16]	<i>Sandworm</i>	An unconfirmed Ukrainian bank	<i>CaddyWiper</i> (malware, wiper)	Files overwritten on machines, making data inaccessible
March 16, 2022 [15]	Unknown	<i>The Ukrainian Red Cross</i> (non-profit humanitarian association)	Web hacking	Information component of the website altered
March 16, 2022	Unknown	<i>Ukraine 24</i> (public TV channel)	PsyOps	Misinformative messages displayed

[15]				
March 17, 2022 [15]	Unknown (<i>UAC-0088</i>)	Several Ukrainian enterprises	<i>DoubleZero</i> (malware, wiper)	Violation of the regular mode of of information system operation
March 28, 2022 [15]	Unknown	<i>Urktelecom</i> (ISP)	Unknown	Connectivity problems
March 30, 2022 [15]	Unknown (<i>UAC-0041</i>)	Several Ukrainian citizens and domestic organizations	<i>MarsStealer</i> (malware)	Phishing campaigns sent via emails; sensitive data stolen, including credentials and personal/corporate information
April 2, 2022 [15]	Unknown (<i>UAC-0094</i>)	Several Ukrainian citizens	Data breach	Phishing campaign sent via Telegram IM; stolen user credentials
April 8, 2022 [15]	<i>SandWorm</i>	Ukrainian Electrical Energy Facility	<i>Industroyer2</i> , <i>CaddyWiper</i> , <i>ORCSHRED</i> , <i>SOLOSHRED</i> , <i>AWFULSHRED</i> (malwares, wipers)	[Not effective attack] Potential electrical blackouts
April 14, 2022 [15]	Unknown (<i>UAC-0098</i>)	Several Ukrainian citizens	<i>IceID</i> (malware, trojan horse)	Phishing campaign through XLS-documents; credentials theft
April 19, 2022 [15]	Unknown	<i>Ukraine 24</i> (TV public channel) public Facebook page	Data breach	, users' credit card data compromised through a fraudulent page

Table 7: Selected cyber-attacks executed against Russia (updated to April 23, 2022)

Date	Attribution	Target	Attack Type	Description/Effects
Feb 27, 2022 [12]	<i>ContiLeaks</i>	<i>Conti</i> Team	Data breach	Internal files related to the <i>Conti</i> group leaked
Feb 28, 2022 [9]	Unknown	<i>Horizon News</i> (Chinese media belonging to <i>Beijing News</i>)	Unknown	Information concerning a China's censorship orders leaked
March 1, 2022 [17]	<i>NB65</i>	Russian military satellites	DDoS	Sensitive system services interrupted
March 1, 2022 [6]	<i>RuRansom Wiper</i>	Several Russian accounts	Malware, wiper	Data loss
March 6, 2022	<i>Squad 303</i>	Several Russian citizens	SMS spam	Creation of a website that lets

[18]				users to send messages to random Russian citizens
March 10, 2022 [6]	<i>Anonymous</i>	<i>Roskomnadzor</i> agency	Data breach	Over 360.000 files, including manuals related to the invasion, leaked
April 7, 2022 [9]	<i>IT Army of Ukraine</i>	<i>Rossgam</i> (Russian social media like Instagram)	Data breach	Creation of a fake phishing app to leak data of users using it
April 8, 2022 [9]	Unknown	Russian Foreign Ministry's online services	DDoS	Service disruptions for the targeted websites
Not dated [6]	<i>Anonymous</i>	Several Russian TV broadcasters, including <i>Russia 24</i> , <i>Channel 1</i> , <i>Moscow 24</i>	PsyOps	Pro-Ukraine information, including Ukrainian anthem and conflict scenes, supposed to be censored in Russia displayed
Not dated [6]	<i>IT Army of Ukraine</i>	Several Russian banks, power grid, railway system and <i>Rostec</i> conglomerate	DDoS	Services compromission, including bank withdraw

4. Conclusions

We have analysed the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict by focusing on the activities of cyber-collectives aimed to protect one specific country. We found that several profiles have emerged during the conflict, some of them already existing before the beginning of the military operations, e.g., *Conti* and *SandWorm* on the Russian side, or *Anonymous* on the Ukrainian side. We also analysed that some other groups were born during the conflict itself, such as the *IT Army of Ukraine*.

We also selected the most relevant attacks executed by the considered cyber-collectives to provide a historical overview of the activities perpetrated so far (until April 26, 2022), considering both attacks against Russia and Ukraine. Results show that different kinds of cyber-attacks have been perpetrated and sensitive and critical infrastructures have been successfully targeted.

In the upcoming months, depending on the conflict evolvement, we expect that other profiles will appear, and many additional attacks will be performed on both sides, maybe also involving novel attack techniques [19].

It is important to consider that the appearance of cyber-collectives in such a delicate period further shed lights on how much is important to efficiently protect network infrastructures [20], also in case of a possible unwanted and unhoped extension of the conflict.

References:

1. The Washington Post. Russian troop movements near Ukraine border prompt concern in U.S., Europe. [online]. October 30, 2022. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-troop-movements-near-ukraine-border-prompt-concern-in-us-europe/2021/10/30/c122e57c-3983-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html
2. BBC News. Russia attacks theater sheltering civilians, Ukraine says. [online]. March 17, 2022. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60772331>
3. Council on Foreign Relations. Global Conflict Tracker: Conflict in Ukraine. [online]. April 22, 2022. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>
4. Peterson Institute for International Economics. How effective are sanctions against Russia?. [online]. March 16, 2022. Available at <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/how-effective-are-sanctions-against-russia>
5. New York Times. Inside the Energy War. [online]. March 31, 2022. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-oil-gas-syria.html>
6. Council on Foreign Relations. Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia-Ukraine War. [online]. March 24, 2022. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war>
7. Quintero-Bonilla, Santiago, and Angel Martín del Rey. "A new proposal on the advanced persistent threat: A survey." *Applied Sciences* 10.11 (2020): 3874.
8. Atos. Risks from the Cyberattacks in the RU-UA conflict. [online]. Updated March 25, 2022. Available at <https://atos.net/en/lp/securitydiverisks-from-the-cyberattacks-ru-ua-conflict>
9. GitHub. Ukraine-Cyber-Operations. [online]. April 24, 2022. Available at <https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations>
10. The Verge. Researchers find new destructive wiper malware in Ukraine. [online]. March 14, 2022. Available at <https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/14/22977873/ukraine-new-destructive-caddywiper-malware-eset>
11. State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine. Who is behind the Cyberattacks of Ukraine's Critical Infrastructure: Statistic for March 15-22. [online]. March 25, 2022. Available at <https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/khto-stoyit-za-kiberatakami-na-ukrayinsku-kritichnu-informaciinu-infrastrukturu-statistika-15-22-bereznya>
12. The Record. Russia or Ukraine: Hacking groups take sides. [online]. Updated March 3, 2022 Available at <https://therecord.media/russia-or-ukraine-hacking-groups-take-sides/>
13. Wikipedia. Sandworm (hacker group). [online]. April 16, 2022. Available at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandworm_\(hacker_group\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandworm_(hacker_group))
14. The Guardian. Anonymous: the hacker collective that has declared cyberwar on Russia. [online]. February 27, 2022. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/anonymous-the-hacker-collective-that-has-declared-cyberwar-on-russia>
15. CyberPeace Institute. UKRAINE: Timeline of Cyberattacks. [online]. Updated April 21, 2022. Available at <https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/ukraine-timeline-of-cyberattacks/>
16. The Verge. Researchers find new destructive wiper malware in Ukraine. [online]. March 14, 2022. Available at <https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/14/22977873/ukraine-new-destructive-caddywiper-malware-eset>
17. Sophos News. Russia-Ukraine war: related cyberattack developments. [online]. Updated April 19, 2022. Available at <https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/03/21/russia-ukraine-war-related-cyberattack-developments/>
18. Insider. Hackers built a site that lets anyone text random Russians about the war in Ukraine. [online]. March 16, 2022. Available at <https://www.insider.com/squad303-hacking-russian-ukraine-war-texts-putin-2022-3>
19. Narteni, S., Vaccari, I., Mongelli, M., Aiello, M., & Cambiaso, E. (2021). Evaluating the possibility to perpetrate tunnelling attacks exploiting shortmessage-service. *Journal of Internet Services and Information Security*, 11, 30-46.

20. Balador, A., Kouba, A., Cassioli, D., Foukalas, F., Severino, R., Stepanova, D., Agosta, G.; Xie, J.; Pomante, L.; Mongelli, M.; Pierini, P.; Petersen, S.; Sukuvaara, T. (2018). Wireless communication technologies for safe cooperative cyber physical systems. *Sensors*, 18(11), 4075.

All bibliographic reference links were accessed last time on April 26, 2022.

WHAT IS THE TERRORIST THREAT IN CYBER-SPACE? IS THIS THREAT LIKELY TO GROW IN THE COMING DECADES?

Chalaris Michail

MA, Ph.D., Assistant Professor & Retd Major General HFCs, ORCID ID 0000-0002-4104-1859, +306978118045, mchalaris@chem.ihu.gr
Department of Chemistry, School of Science, International Hellenic University, 65404 Kavala, Greece

Last decades our everyday life has changed dramatically due to the globalization which is affecting with a significant way the way we work; we communicate and socialize. The technology evolution has affected societies with electronic systems and this technological development could not leave terrorism untouched.

Terrorism is a complex concept and activity and could not be explained fully by one theory or another. The terrorism as a term is not even agreed and that makes it more difficult and more complex, although it is by its nature. Before 2001, the traditionally concept of terrorism and the related methods of attacks were car bombs, hijacking, and political assassinations. After 2001, new threats and scenarios started to grow such as airplanes, trains or vessels could easily be turned against countries and people, as new, unrealized forms of terrorist attacks. Cyber-terrorism, as a new trend in terrorism since it is often referred to by the public and mass media. The rise of the Internet, the development of technology and cyber capabilities have further increased the fear and focus on cyber-terrorism. Terrorists need communication to exist and pass their demands; for that reason, terrorists have started to use online capabilities, the technological advancements and social media becoming more sophisticated, and improving their cyber-related skills.

The cyber terrorism is a new type of terrorist attack. It refers to the attack taking place in cyber-space, where the flow of information momentarily evolves through its global network. Cyber-attacks, cyber espionage, stealing governments' information are few examples of the new form of terrorism which, most importantly, hides a political motive. Cyberspace is one immense reality, an electronic landscape where data moves with great speed; it is an electronic environment created as a sum of worldwide telecommunication resources without geographical and national borders.

Using terms such as cyber-crime and cyber-attack, we are trying to define the origin of this phenomenon. At the same time, the political background of the new kind of terrorism and the extent of the threat it poses to international security, is being investigated interactively through the science of international relations and geopolitical analysis.

While cyber systems introduce benefits, they also create risk. Misuse, exploitation, and even simple failure of these systems may lead to injuries or deaths, or disruption of the vital trade activity.

Approaching the new kind of terrorism, we understand that terrorism is not just about the political life of a country, but it also extends to international politics. The political background of the new kind of terrorism and the extent of the threat it poses to international security, is being investigated interactively through the science of international relations and geopolitical analysis.

The definition of cyber-terrorism is very complicated. At an early stage we could classify it a phenomenon in the broader spectrum of terrorism, separating the instrument of action this. In other words, the simple interpretation of the term is that cyber-terrorism is the act of terrorism through use computer. The purpose of the attack through cyber space comprises four categories: loss of integrity, the loss of availability, the lack of privacy and the physical destruction.

Cybercrime is growing continuously. Thousands of cyber-attacks are reported, such as virus attacks, electronic scams, spoofing attacks, etc. Obviously, we can understand the fact that, cyber-terrorism has evolved rapidly over the last few years. All that is needed is very good knowledge of

computer and networks. The evolution of the cyber terrorism is a component of the modern security framework and is spread from the banking services till the defense.

Terrorism exists as long as humanity does. Cyber-terrorism is the execution of any cybercrime that can seriously harm a country or an international organization and intend to intimidate population, or illegally forcing a public authority or international organization to commit or abstain from any act or to seriously harm or destroy the fundamental constitutional. Cyber-terrorism is a more specific concept than cybercrime and it is not the same with it.

This new kind of terrorism comes in a time when technology progress is evolving rapidly. The mass of information and of cyber data prevents them from being identified responsible for any attack, also leading to erroneous estimates and speculations. Part of the problem is the inability of governments to react catalytically to this dangerous, public safety hazard, and phenomenon.

Comparing terrorist attacks with those in the past we realize that nowadays their attaches are becoming more sophisticated in a rapid way and are designed to achieve mass casualties, and the trend towards greater lethality will continue (Global Trends 2015). Terrorist attacked are supported by international organizations through the world which offer to terrorist huge capabilities in order to achieve their goals.

The effective treatment of this realistic threat, the cyber-terrorism, requires action at European and international level, and in particular the use of a common, universal definition that keep in mind that cyber-terrorism does not "know" local and temporal constraints, does not require the physical presence and presence of the perpetrator; all of which can take on indefinite and unpredictable dimensions in the digital world.

Governments have taken measures to find out and eliminate terrorism and additionally have designed adequate defenses and security barriers to prevent attacks. Terrorists try to continually advance their methods to survive and succeed by overcoming the governmental defenses and barriers. Therefore, it is critical for the terrorists to be one step ahead of the counterterrorism, adjust their tactics, modus operandi and sometimes even their weapon systems (Hoffman, 1998). Therefore, terrorism seems to adapt to such changes and finds other ways to act.

When reading the term cyber-terrorism makes it clear that the first component of it refers to "cybercrime", that is, to the point of being and operating in the digital cyber space. For this reason, in the main definitions of cybercrime, there is talk of attacking "information" systems, networks, etc., concepts which as we shall see below are essential conceptual elements of cyberspace, which were first legislated in the Budapest Convention in 2001.

Terrorism will probably exist as long as humanity does and will keep on creating new forms and trends in order to adapt and continue to exist.

References:

1. Richardson, L. (2006). *The ROOTS of Terrorism*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2. Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. 2nd edn. (New York: Columbia University Press)
3. International Encyclopedia of Terrorism 1997 "The Assassins :A terror cult"
4. European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, *What we do, Policies, Crisis & Terrorism*
5. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
6. Hodgson, J. S., & Tadros, V. (2013). The impossibility of defining terrorism. *New Criminal Law Review*, 16(3), 495-526
7. G. (2013). Definition of terrorism - social and political. *Journal of Military and Veterans Health*, 21(2), 26-30
8. Lara Schmidt, "Perspective on 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy", The RAND Corporation, September 29, 2015.
9. Hubac-Occhipinti, O. (2007) *Anarchist Terrorists of the Nineteenth Century in The history of terrorism: from antiquity to al Qaeda* / (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press p.114-5

10. Liaropoulos, A. N. (2011) Cyber-Security and the Law of War: The Legal and Ethical Aspects of Cyber-Conflict, Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG), Working Paper #07
11. Europol, The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2008
12. Computer crime, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_crime
13. Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008) A Systematic Examination of Terrorist Use of the Internet. *International Journal of Cyber Criminology*, Vol 2 Issue 1 January 2008 Available at link - (accessed July 20, 2016)
14. Rogan, H. (2006) Jihadism online A study of how Al- Qaida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purposes, FORSVARETS FORSKNINGSINSTITUTT (FFI) Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Available at link -(accessed June 14, 2016)
15. Denning, D. (2000) Cyberterrorism. Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives. Georgetown University May 23, 2000, (accessed April 12, 2022)
16. Ganor Boaz, von Knop, Katharina, M. Duarte Carlos A(eds). "Hypermedia seduction for terrorist recruiting". IOS Press, 2007, p.39
17. Paul Eedle, "Al-Qaeda Takes Fight for 'Hearts and Minds' to the Web," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 2002, rpt. in CNO/IO Newsletter, 5-11 August 2002.
18. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Non-government
19. Experts. NIC 2000-02 (December 2000). David Bieda, Leila Halawi, *Cyberspace: A Venue for Terrorism* 2015
20. NATO Review https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/index_EN.htm (accessed April 12, 2022)
21. Global Terrorism Database <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/> (accessed April 12, 2022)

CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTILITIES ON THE SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF LITHUANIAN REGIONS

Gečienė Jolita

doctoral student/ Affiliated lecturer
Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania
geciene.j@mruni.eu

Abstract. The article analyses the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the social sustainability of Lithuanian regions. As the war continues, insecurity, fear and environmental uncertainty increase. Residents of Lithuanian regions are faced with anxiety, which fundamentally changes the routine and lifestyle of life. Society loses its sense of joy, abandons things that used to cheer up, follows the news about the consequences of war. This war worries the public and leaves long-term consequences in the regions of Lithuania.

The aim – is to reveal in which areas the consequences of the consequences of the war are manifested in relation to the social sustainability of Lithuanian regions and to identify the factors of vulnerability of Lithuanian regions.

The research method – is a theoretical analysis of scientific and statistical literature. The search for publications was carried out on the search for academic literature on the Google Scholar platform.

Keywords: war, Consequences of war, Russia's war in Ukraine, Regions of Lithuania, features of vulnerable regions, social sustainability of regions.

The analysis of the statistics was carried out on the official statistics portal stat.gov by region.

Regional vulnerability factors in the context of social sustainability

Recently, Russia's war in Ukraine is not limited to Ukraine, but also threatens the whole of Europe and, at the same time, the sustainability of Lithuanian regions.

The issues of regional social sustainability are becoming increasingly important for both researchers and practitioners in today's climate of change. On the one hand, sustainability is analysed as sustainable development, with an emphasis on human livelihood as an integral means of achieving ecological goals. On the other hand, aspects of natural resources and the environment are also included in the analysis of the concept of sustainability, since the rational use of natural capital is the basis for sustainability (Long et al. 2020). The analysis of the phenomenon of regional social sustainability can be based on socially oriented practices aimed at addressing the most important social problems in order to overcome environmental risks. The focus is therefore on the ability of regions to face ecological, social, economic, technological and governance challenges and the ability to engage in collaborative processes in planning and implementing change, taking into account their existing constraints and the infrastructure of regional organisations. (Stanković et al. 2021).

The issues of Lithuanian regions in terms of regional social sustainability are today a particularly topical topic both nationally and internationally. The implementation of interrelated ecological, social, economic and technological principles is important for ensuring regional social sustainability. Looking at the emergencies of recent years, it can be assumed that regions that are not in a favourable geographical position, which do not have exceptional natural resources and high institutional indicators, may face potential difficulties that increase the vulnerability of regions. (Calero and Turner, 2020).

When assessing the inequalities of Lithuanian regions in terms of vulnerability, it is important to highlight the following factors of regional vulnerability:

- economic factors - different levels of intensity of economic factors in different regions can

become the cause of the vulnerability of the region (Toader et al. 2018). Economic inequality in the regions is an economic inequality that is associated with income inequality, especially the different salaries received by the population to meet normal living needs (Iammarino et al. 2019). Russia's attack on Ukraine also has economic consequences, the impact of which has already manifested itself – rising prices of raw materials and energy resources are increasing inflation in many countries;

- social factors include a link to regional adaptation and therefore have a strong link with evolution, the level of education in society, the quality of medical services, culture, change and crisis situations, etc. (Balugani et al., 2020);

- geographical (external) factors – the gap between large cities and rural areas; environmental changes; climate change affected by various emergencies, etc. (Kamseu et al. 2021). After nuclear explosions, the effects of radioactive contamination in the regions are felt (Svirezhev, 2022);

- political factors – relate to the reduction of economic and social disparities at different times, dependence on the public sector, insufficient coordination of development processes, etc. (Bergs, 2021);

- historical factors are the initial factors that influenced the further causes of regional vulnerabilities, historical and cultural experiences (Xavier et al. 2019). Historical factors in terms of vulnerability are related to the lack of historically important events, regions not characterized by specific cultural characteristics, low sociocultural criteria, low cultural values, etc.

- Emergency factors – an environment of uncertainties decisive by an emergency, disruption of global supply chains affecting the availability of basic products, limited free movement of persons, goods and services, etc.

All of the above groups of traits relate to each other and to all the features that define the vulnerability of the regions. It is understood that the vulnerability and insecurity of Lithuanian regions are currently influenced by hostilities. As Russia's military invasion of Ukraine continues, the consequences of brutal aggression are felt not only by Lithuanian regions, but practically by the whole world.

Results of the study

By systematizing the results of the study and summarizing the factors of the regions most vulnerable to social sustainability, it can be noted that six groups of traits related to each other stand out, namely:

- historical features' means the initial ones that influence the further causes of regional vulnerability;

- geographical features' means the geographical characteristics describing the geographical location indicators;

- consequences of emergencies;

- social features that reveal the parameters of social development;

- political features that define political participation;

- economic characteristics define economic characteristics.

All six distinct groups of traits relate to each other and to all the features that define the vulnerability of regions.

Conclusions

It has been found that those regions that are vulnerable to social sustainability are classified according to the factors that determine the vulnerability of the regions. Economic factors, the sustainability of regions, are most pronounced, while the weakness of these traits determines the vulnerability of regions. In order to avoid vulnerability and strengthen sustainability in the regions, development of social sustainability, ensuring energy and environmental indicators, political stability, fostering cultural values and overcoming emergencies are needed.

In order to reduce vulnerability and ensure regional sustainability, the most important thing

is to find a way to stop Russia's attack on Ukraine.

References:

1. Ahir, H., Bloom, N., Furceri, D. (2022). „The world uncertainty index“ *National bureau of economic research*.
2. Balugani, E., Butturi, M. A., Chevers, D., Parker, D., ir Rimini, B. (2020). Empirical Evaluation of the Impact of Resilience and Sustainability on Firms' Performance. *Sustainability*, 12(5), 1742. doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12051742>.
3. Bergs, R. (2021). Spatial dependence in the rank-size distribution of cities – weak but not negligible. *PLOS ONE*, 16(2), 1-16. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246796>.
4. Calero, C., ir Turner, L. W. (2020). Regional economic development and tourism: A literature review to highlight future directions for regional tourism research. *Tourism Economics*, 26(1), 3–26. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354816619881244>.
5. Iammarino, S., Rodriguez-Pose, A., ir Storper, M. (2019). Regional inequality in Europe: Evidence, theory and policy implications. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 19(2), 273–298. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lby021>.
6. Kamseu, E., Alzari, V., Nuvoli, D., Sanna, D., Lancellotti, I., Mariani, A., ir Leonelli, C. (2021). Dependence of the geopolymerization process and end-products to the nature of solid precursors: Challenge of the sustainability. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 278, 2-13. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123587>.
7. Leon D.A., Jdanov D., Gerry, Ch.,J., Grigoriev P., d Jasilionis D., McKee M., Mesle F., Penina O., Twigg J., Vallin J., Vagero D. (2022). „The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its public health consequences“. *The Lancet Regional Health – Europe* 2022;15: 100358.
8. Long, X., Yu, H., Sun, M., Wang, X.-C., Klemeš, J. J., Xie, W., Wang, C., Li, W., ir Wang, Y. (2020). Sustainability evaluation based on the Three-dimensional Ecological Footprint and Human Development Index: A case study on the four island regions in China. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 265, 1-12. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110509>.
9. Stanković, J. J., Marjanović, I., Papathanasiou, J., ir Drezgić, S. (2021). Social, Economic and Environmental Sustainability of Port Regions: MCDM Approach in Composite Index Creation. *Journal of Marine Science and Engineering*, 9(1), 74. doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse9010074>.
10. Svirezhev Y.,M. (2022). „Ecological and Demographic Consequences of a Nuclear War In the series Mathematical Ecology“. *Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter*.
11. Toader, E., Firtescu, B., Roman, A., ir Anton, S. (2018). Impact of Information and Communication Technology Infrastructure on Economic Growth: An Empirical Assessment for the EU Countries. *Sustainability*, 10(10), 1-22. doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103750>.
12. Xavier, L. H., Giese, E. C., Ribeiro-Duthie, A. C., ir Lins, F. A. F. (2019). Sustainability and the circular economy: A theoretical approach focused on e-waste urban mining. *Resources Policy*, 2411-2502. doi:101467. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.101467>.
13. Zhongming Z., Wei L. (2022) „War in Ukraine: reflections on the economic consequences for Russia“. *Europod*. resp.llas.ac.cn.

CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. ASPECTS REGARDING THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Gligor Raluca-Clarisa

Teaching Assistant PhD. Candidate

„1 Decembrie 1918” University from Alba Iulia

raluca.gligor@uab.ro

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1065-8514

Pleşa Ioana-Andra

Lecturer PhD.

„1 Decembrie 1918” University from Alba Iulia

ioana.plesa@uab.ro

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7658-861>

Abstract. On February 24, 2022, the whole world was shaken by the collapse of what we call to be fundamental values specific to a World of the 21st century. Ukraine, a sovereign and independent state like other European states, has become a battleground.

Ukraine is on the defensive to defend values recognized by all states, Ukraine is fighting not only to preserve territorial integrity, but to preserve its national identity and maintain the fundamental values specific to any sovereign and independent state.

Ukraine has become a symbol of the struggle for the specific values of a democratic society.

War is the annihilation of everything that the world has acquired so far, war overturns what we call the "principle of self-determination", overturns the concept of human rights: life, freedom.

This flagrant violation of rights and principles guaranteed by public international law is unacceptable, but beyond imagination it is the mode of operation that is used to annihilate these values. When the first civilian, whether a child, an adult or an elderly person, paid with his life, the price of this war, the concept of humanity disappeared, and this situation can not be tolerated.

Keywords: war, human rights, crimes against humanity, fundamental values.

1. General aspects concerning crimes against humanity.

According to Article 6 of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the following acts are offenses which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which the individual perpetrator will be held liable: Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparing, initiating or conducting a war of aggression or war in violation of treaties, international agreements or insurance, or participation in a joint plan or conspiracy to carry out any of the above; War crimes: namely violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations will include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or any other purpose of the civilian population in or on the occupied territory, killing or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons at sea, killing of hostages, looting of public or private property, no doubt the destruction of towns or villages, or unjustified devastation of military necessity; Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecution for political, racial or religious reasons in the execution of, or in connection with, any offense under the jurisdiction of the General Court, whether or not it has violated the domestic law of the country in which it was committed. (Nuremberg IMT-Statute <https://ro.sodiummedia.com/4206864-nuremberg-tribunal-statute-main-principles-and-exclusive-competence>)

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices involved in the formulation or execution of a joint plan or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses.

According to the provisions of Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court and are implicitly considered crimes of extreme gravity:

- a) crime of genocide;
- b) crimes against humanity;
- c) war crimes;

d) the crime of aggression. (According to art. 5 point 2 of the present statute, the Court will exercise its competence regarding the crime of aggression when a provision is adopted according to art. 121 and 123, which will define this crime and will set the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to it. This provision must be compatible with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”)

2. Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

According to art. 6 of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the crime of genocide ([www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/cdiu/Statutul CPI.htm](http://www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/cdiu/Statutul%20CPI.htm) 3/91 09/01/14 Statutul CPI) means any of the acts mentioned below, committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, namely: the killing of members of the group; serious harm to the physical or mental integrity of members of the group; intentional subjection of the group to conditions of existence which would lead to its total or partial physical destruction; measures to prevent births within the group; forced transfer of children belonging to one group to another.

Article 7 of the same document states that by crimes against humanity (Idem 09/01/14 Statutul CPI) it is understood one of the facts mentioned below, when it is committed in a generalized or systematic attack launched against a civilian population and in the knowledge of this attack: murder; extermination; slavery; forced deportation or transfer of population; imprisonment or other form of serious deprivation of physical liberty, in violation of the fundamental provisions of international law; torture, rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable severity; persecution of any identifiable group or community for political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or sexual reasons within the meaning of paragraph 3, or in accordance with other criteria universally recognized as inadmissible under international law, in connection with any act provided for in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court: enforced disappearances by persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of an analogous nature intentionally causing great suffering or serious harm to physical integrity or physical or mental health. In the same note, according to art. 8 of the Statute, the Court has jurisdiction over war crimes, especially when these crimes are part of a plan or policy or when they are part of a series of similar crimes committed on a large scale.

For the purposes of the Statute, war crimes include: serious offenses under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely any of the acts listed below, if they relate to persons or property protected by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions: Intentional homicide; torture and inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; the act of intentionally causing great suffering or seriously injuring physical integrity or health; destruction and misappropriation of goods, unjustified by military necessity and executed on a large scale in an illicit and arbitrary manner; the act of forcing a prisoner of war or a protected person to serve in the forces of an enemy power; the intentional deprivation of a prisoner of war or any other person protected by his or her right to a fair and impartial trial; illegal deportation or transfer or illegal detention; taking hostages; ([www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/cdiu/Statutul CPI.htm](http://www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/cdiu/Statutul%20CPI.htm) 6/91)

In private international law, adequate protection is given to persons who do not take part in hostilities or who, due to their state of health or captivity, can no longer continue to take part in armed conflict. According to the law of Geneva, the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked, the prisoners of war, are people who must be protected in any situation, by protection is understood the respect of human rights such as the right to life, health, food, respect for dignity and so on. a. An extremely important category is also represented by the civilian population, which, although not participating in military operations, is undoubtedly affected. It is therefore imperative that the

human condition and all the rights inherent in human beings be respected in this category as well, and that the Contracting States be obliged to authorize humanitarian action which may consist of food, clothing, medicine. ş.a (Adrian Năstase, Bogdan Aurescu, Cristian Jura, International public law. Synthesis for the exam. Edition 5, revised and added, C. H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 478.).

Romania aligns itself with the democratic states, granting adequate protection, through legislation, to the most important fundamental values and condemning any acts meant to endanger the rule of law, to destroy or bring down any national, ethnic, racial, religious groups.

Even if the criminal law is governed by the principle of territoriality, we consider it opportune to review the Romanian regulations. According to art. 438 para. (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, the commission, in order to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, of one of the following acts: the killing of members of the group; harm to the physical or mental integrity of some members of the group; subjecting the group to conditions of existence likely to lead to its physical destruction, in whole or in part; the imposition of measures to prevent births within the group or the forced transfer of children belonging to one group to another group shall be punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment from 15 to 20 years and the prohibition of the exercise of certain rights. If these acts take place during the war, the penalty will be life imprisonment. According to art. 439 of the Criminal Code, committing in a generalized or systematic attack, launched against a civilian population, acts of killing persons, subjecting the population to living conditions intended to cause their physical destruction, enslavement, torture, assault and injury of any kind or persecution, shall be punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment from 15 to 25 years and the prohibition of the exercise of certain rights.

Regarding the Romanian legislation on war crimes, the Romanian Criminal Code expressly stipulates in art. 440 para. (1) the commission, in an armed conflict, with or without an international character, of one or more persons protected by international humanitarian law, such acts as murder, hostage-taking, cruel or inhuman treatment, rape or sexual assault in order to change the ethnic composition of a population, deportation or forced transfer, in violation of the rules of international law, of persons legally in a certain territory, by expelling them to another state or territory or by using other measures of coercion, the imposition or enforcement of a severe sentence, in particular the death penalty or imprisonment, against a person who has not been tried in a lawful and impartial procedure, offering the guarantees required by international law, and exposure of a person to a danger of death or serious harm to health by being subjected to methods of treatment unknown person, removal of tissues or organs for the purpose of transplantation, degrading treatment, life imprisonment or imprisonment from 15 to 25 years and the prohibition of the exercise of certain rights.

We appreciate that when atrocities occur, beyond any regulation, any healthy society should instinctively show immediate reaction in identifying medium- and long-term solutions. Romania, like other European countries, has shown humanity, getting involved and offering support to those who are at a standstill. However, beyond the reaction of the whole world to the events that are taking place and which will certainly significantly mark the future, we should not lose sight of the fact that any action that results in the loss of human lives is a destructive action. We believe that states should not "get lost" in the whirlwind of the latest constant media events, but should adopt an attitude of condemnation of all attacks on human life, as recent history shows that the first wars were not lost in the Russian-Ukrainian war. human lives, and not the last, if the attitude will be condemnatory only in regard to some aggressors. We think so because life is a supreme, intangible right, the violation of which cannot be justified.

Conclusions

Beyond the situation in Ukraine, which is beyond any limits of normalcy and humanity, beyond the lost lives, we can expected to feel effects on several levels, effects that come as a result of the pandemic triggered by the emergence of COVID-19 and followed by the he crisis generated by the war started by Russia.

Undoubtedly, the sudden transition to another major impact event such as the Russian-Ukrainian crisis will have significant social and economic consequences, and the effects are already being felt by the population. The accelerated rise in prices in all sectors is being felt in the standard of living which, for some, was moderate or modest, is now declining in terms of survival. Those who did not have much, will not have nothing at all, and those who have economies, are more careful with investments because they are incert.

The attack of a state that shows tendencies to associate with the european bloc, is warning not only its neighbors but the entire European world and also the states that are part of NATO.

Regardless of the ambition or the real reasons behind the aggression, we believe that this conflict must not turn into a tolerated one, but it is extremely important to sustain effective communication between the parties involved. Only an open attitude towards dialogue will be able to at least mitigate the consequences of this oppressive conflict.

At some point the persons which are responsable will endure the rigors of the law but that will not bring life back to those who lost it fighting for ideals and values nor the lives of collateral victims.

References:

- 1.Năstase, Adrian, Aurescu, Bogdan, Jura, Cristian, International public law. Synthesis for the exam. 5th edition, revised and added, C. H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.
- 2.Romanian Criminal Code.
- 3.www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/cdiu/ International Criminal Court Statute htm 3/91 09/01/14
4. Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribuna

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Iliev Plamen

Ch. Assistant Professor Dr.
New Bulgarian University-Sofia

Abstract: The invasion of Ukraine in Ukraine shocks the whole world, not only politically, but also economically. The sanctions imposed in response to the war are almost unseen in their size and scale and can lead to an economic division of the war. The war and the sanctions will lead to severe consequences not only for Russia and Ukraine, but also for the whole world. Globalnite pazapi na cypovini ca in abcolyuten shok ppez poclednite nyakolko days and ima pealen pick nivata na potpebitelcka inflatsiya, koito taka or inache byaxa zapochnali ea chypyat pekopdi, ea eckalipat oshte poveche and ea ce ppevapnat in lavinoobpazen ikonomichecki shok, koyto mozhe ea ppedizvika nova globalna petition.

Keywords: crisis, war, consequences, prices, economy

The consequences of the war in Ukraine could be catastrophic, with more than 60-65% of Ukrainians expected to fall below the poverty line, and the whole world could be flooded with hunger and poverty.

A report prepared by the United Nations Development Program presents various scenarios for how many people can fall below the poverty line. The numbers are "extremely alarming", according to UNDP chief Achim Steiner to the ARD. According to the report, Ukraine's GDP could shrink by 35%

Almost three million people have already left the country, with the addition of internal refugees. "These are numbers that, of course, frighten us and remind us that in this war we need to focus on both urgent needs and plans on how to stabilize the economy and how to prevent short-term measures. millions of people below the poverty line, "said Steiner.

Many enterprises in Ukraine are already closed. The others work in limited mode. The International Monetary Fund predicts that gross domestic product will shrink by 35 percent. This means that many people in Ukraine will have to make a living from their savings - and in a situation of supply problems.

The consequences of the war in Ukraine will not be limited to the country or the region. All over the world, people have to pay more for basic foodstuffs. Russia and Ukraine produce nearly 30 percent of the world's wheat. Many of the world's poorest countries are dependent on imports from both countries.

In this regard, UN Secretary-General A. Guterres warned of the danger of a "hurricane of hunger", and Steiner is worried about the debt crisis, especially in developing countries. "Many forget that we are still in a pandemic of the crown virus, whose social and economic consequences are leading to a critical situation, especially in developing countries."

Russia's invasion of Ukraine may have been quick and dramatic, but not unexpected. On the other hand, the economic consequences will materialize much more slowly and less spectacularly. This is extremely tragic, especially for the Ukrainian people, but also for the Russian people and the global order in general.

As a result, financial markets reacted quickly to news of Russia's invasion, with the MSCI All Country World Index, the world's leading equity indicator, falling to its lowest level in nearly a year, with oil prices rising above \$ 100 a barrel and European natural gas prices jumped by more than 70%.

Rising energy prices will have a negative impact on the world economy. Europe is particularly vulnerable because it has done too little in recent years to reduce its dependence on

Russian gas, and in some cases - especially Germany, which has given up nuclear energy - has even increased it significantly.

According to Prof. Jason Ferman, Project Syndicate, former chairman of President Barack Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, Russia is likely to be the biggest economic loser in the coming years (after Ukraine, of course, whose losses will exceed what it can be measured in national accounts).

Russia's economy and the well-being of its population have stagnated since the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The consequences of its current large-scale invasion will almost certainly be more serious over time. Sanctions will have an increasing impact, and Russia's growing isolation, as well as heightened investor uncertainty, will weaken trade and other economic ties. In addition, Europe can be expected to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels from Russia.

There is a risk, although relatively unlikely, that higher short-term inflation will become a persistent element in rising inflation expectations and thus continue for a long time. If this happens, the already difficult work of central banks will become even more complicated.

In addition, defense budgets are likely to increase in Europe, the United States and some other countries to reflect the increasingly dangerous global situation. This will not reduce GDP growth, but it will reduce people's well-being, because resources for defense are resources that cannot go to consumption or investment in education, health or infrastructure.

The war in Ukraine will have more severe economic consequences for Europe than after the coronavirus pandemic, according to Volkswagen CEO Herbert Diess. According to him, if the conflict dragged on, the tension on the economy would be much more serious than after the two years when the coronavirus was the number one topic.

The difficult situation in Ukraine also raises the issue of food security and sovereignty in Europe, and to limit the effects of the conflict on the availability of basic agricultural products, the European Commission has proposed a series of measures discussed on April 7 by European agriculture ministers.

The consequences of the war in Ukraine are already being felt in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, giving up Russian gas will not be as easy as it seems in a political declaration. There are also technological problems, it takes time to solve them. Most likely, I am moving towards a worse scenario than the European Central Bank predicts in its most pessimistic forecasts, according to A. Nikolov, an economist at the Institute for Market Economics.

According to him, the economic growth in the country, set in this year's budget of 4.8%, seems impossible due to rising energy prices, as well as due to strong underestimation of inflation.

The economic consequences of the war in Ukraine will be felt in the next three to five years, predicts financier Pr. Raikov. According to him, the main effects will be felt through rising food, oil and natural gas prices, as well as some key raw materials supplied mainly by Russia and Ukraine.

Inflation will be higher than expected, which may force central banks to raise higher interest rates in an attempt to tame it, Raikov said.

The war and the sanctions will lead to severe consequences not only for Russia and Ukraine, but also for the whole world. Globalnite pazapi na cypovini ca in shok ppez poclednite nyakolko days and ima pealen pick nivata na potpebitelcka inflatsiya, koito taka or inache byaxa zapochnali ea chypyat pekopdi, ea eckalipat oshte poveche and ea ce ppevapnat in lavinoobpazen ikonomichecki shok, koyto mozhe ea ppedizvika nova globalna petseciya .

The rising prices of the countries, the prices of the energy, the prices of the industrial countries, etc. are "working" in this direction.

However, this shows that we can expect the inflationary shock to intensify, in a short-term plan. And in the middle of nowhere, we are probably expecting an economic crisis. Extremely high price shocks, especially for energy products, usually lead to recession.

In light of all this, rising energy prices are leading the European manufacturing industry to price non-competitiveness in terms of the final price of goods produced. In the international market, goods produced in the EU are beginning to become uncompetitive in price compared to countries such as China and Turkey, which have energy sources lower than European prices.

In addition, European industry is expected to rapidly lose its commodity markets such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, which supply grain and cereals, including European livestock, metals for construction and engineering, coal and more.

Not only Europe's geographical constraints, but also the scarcity or high levels of raw material prices for industry, the loss of markets due to sanctions, the feeling of insecurity in European society - all this will lead to reduced investment (international and local) and the inevitable devaluation of the European currency. In addition, the burden on EU social systems of refugees from Ukraine undoubtedly leads to various disparities in the European economy, but also creates opportunities as the EU's workforce grows.

The combination of rising fuel prices and the devaluation of the European currency will pose severe challenges for businesses in Europe. Both in the manufacturing sector and in tourism. Bankruptcies and rising unemployment are among the expected consequences of difficulties in production and tourism.

References:

1. <https://www.dw.com/bg/>
2. <https://www.monitor.bg/bg/a/view/>
3. <https://money.bg/economics>
4. <https://www.bloombergtv.bg/a/16-biznes-start>
5. <https://www.dnevnik.bg/analizi>
6. https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika

KISSINGER'S PLAN FOR UKRAINE REVISED

Ivanov L.L.

PhD, assoc. prof.

Tel.: +359 887 000 172; e-mail: lyubomail@yahoo.com

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Mathematics and Informatics
Bl. 8, Akad. Georgi Bonchev Street, 1113, Sofia, Bulgaria

Even as the Ukraine War is progressing we see an increased interest in analyzing its outcome and follow up. The scenarios considered range from calling for a no-fly zone (Philip Breedlove),[1] to some sort of compromise (Henry Kissinger),[2] to a willful surrender of the West (David Pyne).[3]

Needless to say, one of the fundamental issues to be resolved is the territorial sovereignty of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. Any peace agreement ceding these territories to Russia should provide for a full and complete compensation, and the present article deals with this often overlooked necessity.

Discussing confrontation and wars in his opinion piece “To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end” published in *The Washington Post* edition of 5 March 2014,[2] former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger aptly advised that the test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins. He proposed a set of four principles for settling the Ukraine crisis, warning that if some solution along those or comparable lines was not achieved, then the drift toward confrontation would accelerate, and the time for that would come soon enough. As it turned out, no such settlement was reached and now, eight years later, we got a full-fledged war waged by Russia against Ukraine instead.

It seems high time to start at the end all over again, revisiting and possibly revising Kissinger's original plan. For that purpose, we recall also the comparable principles suggested in our article “Falkland Islands and Crimea the new cold war” of 7 May 2014 discussing the Crimean conflict and its parallel with the Falklands.[4] We focus primarily on the territorial sovereignty and foreign and security policy aspects, leaving aside other key post-war issues like the necessity for a Marshall Plan for Ukraine and its funding scheme proposed by Ukrainian ex-premier Oleksiy Honcharuk and Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev.[5]

Kissinger's first principle was, respecting Ukraine's choice to become part of the European Union rather than some Eurasian integration initiative. Apparently, this choice is deemed uncontroversial by Russia – although the EU may well come to develop increasingly robust security and defence capabilities of its own and in close cooperation with NATO. This geopolitical choice of Ukraine is the greatest loss to Moscow, further diminishing the already meagre prospects for a viable supranational integration project in the space between Europe and China.

The next two principles of Kissinger's were Finlandization and NATO non-membership of Ukraine. The problem is, these could hardly be imposed indefinitely upon a sovereign state. As pointed out by Norwegian diplomat Helge Vindenes (his letter “Sovereignty also means freedom to change policy” published in the *Financial Times* edition of 4 February 2022),[6] nothing is more central for a country's sovereignty than the ability to change its foreign and security policies when circumstances in its view require that to be done. In other words, to ensure it would not join NATO, Ukraine should readily agree to give up sovereignty and become a sort of Russian protectorate. Therefore, for a sovereign Ukrainian state the relevant principle is: NATO membership if Kyiv so wishes, implementing the NATO Heads of State and Government decision of 3 April 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.[7] The Allies should promptly invite both Ukraine and Georgia to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.

Kissinger's last principle stipulated that Russia would recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea as it was incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. True enough, yet hardly the point that might drive possible negotiations forward. On the other

hand, why should Ukraine be prepared to relinquish her internationally recognized rights over Crimea for nothing? The same goes for the self-declared People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (Fig. 1). A stumbling block if there ever was one, this territorial sovereignty imbroglio warrants some further elaboration.



Fig. 1. Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk




Fig. 2. Novaya Zemlya

Keeping Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk Ukrainian would certainly be the best choice. Failing that, second best would be the territory swap suggested in our quoted article [4], for it is only a territory gain that could compensate for a territory loss. Say, Crimea and the two breakaway republics might be recognized as Russian with certain uninhabited or sparsely populated Russian territories – like the polar archipelago of Novaya Zemlya (Fig. 2) – ceded in return to Ukraine. The value of the swapped entities could be balanced by a delimitation of Crimea's share in the Black Sea exclusive economic zone disproportionately favouring Ukraine.

Early in the process, the Ukrainians might be asked on a referendum if they believe that any change in the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine may only happen by way of an agreed territory swap – or, more specifically, if they believe Ukraine should be compensated by Russian territory in case Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk were recognized as Russian.

The present settlement proposal is probably nonstandard, possibly win-win, and definitely not a compromise one. Its implementation would be in compliance with international law, facilitating a return to normalcy and reinvigoration of the world order as we knew it.

References:

1. A. Mackinnon. Former NATO Commander: 'Is the West Going to Tolerate Russia Doing This to Ukraine?' *Foreign Policy*, 27 February 2022
2. H. Kissinger. To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end. *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2014
3. D.T. Pyne. How Biden Can End the War in Ukraine. *The National Interest*, 11 March 2022
4. L. Ivanov. Falkland Islands and Crimea the new cold war. *MercoPress: South Atlantic News Agency*, 7 May 2014

5. O. Honcharuk and V. Inozemtsev. A Reconstruction Plan for Ukraine. March 2022 (Private communication)
6. H. Vindenes. Sovereignty also means freedom to change policy. Financial Times, 4 February 2022
7. Bucharest Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008

SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Klimenko A.Y.

D.Eng, FCI

The University of Queensland, Australia

Abstract. This work presents analysis of the causes and possible outcomes of Russian aggression against Ukraine that is based on the systems approach to complex phenomena. The war is viewed as yet another collision of two major social subsystems: democratic and autocratic. The outcomes of this war will have a profound impact on future development of our civilisation.

Keywords: systems analysis, complex evolving systems, crisis of modern civilisation

СИСТЕМНИЙ ПОГЛЯД НА ПРИЧИНИ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Клименко О.Ю.

Д.Інж.

Університет Квінсленду, Австралія

Анотація. У роботі представлений аналіз причин та можливих результатів російської агресії проти України, що базується на системному підході до комплексних явищ. Війна розглядається як чергове зіткнення двох основних соціальних підсистем: демократичної та автократичної. Підсумки цієї війни вплинуть на майбутній розвиток нашої цивілізації.

Ключові слова: системний аналіз, складні еволюційні системи, криза сучасної цивілізації

СИСТЕМНЫЙ ВЗГЛЯД НА ПРИЧИНЫ РОССИЙСКО-УКРАИНСКОЙ ВОЙНЫ

Клименко А.Ю.

Д.Инж.

Университет Квинсленда, Австралия

Аннотация. В работе представлен анализ причин и возможных результатов российской агрессии против Украины, основанный на системном подходе к комплексным явлениям. Война рассматривается как очередное столкновение двух основных социальных подсистем: демократической и автократической. Итоги этой войны окажут глубокое влияние на будущее развитие нашей цивилизации.

Ключевые слова: системный анализ, сложные эволюционирующие системы, кризис современной цивилизации

Autocratic and democratic social subsystems and their historic competition. Human history is full of contradictions and conflicts, and, among these conflicts, competition between autocratic and democratic traditions, which persisted through the centuries, is one of the most prevalent. This competition occurred in many different forms including conflicts between ideas, social subsystems or countries. When considered from the systems perspective [1], autocratic tradition involves a hierarchy of elements subjected to control or partial control from a single centre. Democratic tradition involves complex interactions of influences from multiple centres. While the division of complex social interactions into two contrasting subsystems might be a simplification, it reflects principal features of the real world. Historically, the autocratic tradition was a frequent winner in its competition with democracies due to its ability to mobilise resources against its opponents. Inability of progressive development and growing subjugation of a state to the personal interests of its autocrat are the main

weaknesses of the autocratic system, which made the historic evolution of human society slow and, quite often, painful.

The technological revolution of the industrial age brought a new factor when complex democratic forms of organisation became not only preferable from the humanist perspective but also incomparably stronger economically and militarily than traditionally common autocracies. While not being perfect, the Western civilisation can be recognised among other great cultures and civilisations as reflecting the highest achievements of mankind in technology, science and humanity. These achievements are based on trying to follow (albeit not on every occasion) several cornerstone principles: democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech, free enterprise and individual rights. After two world wars and the collapse of the Soviet Union, democratic tradition overtook autocratic tradition in all respects, but this victory did not last long.

Crisis of the Western values. Thirty years after its spectacular bloodless victory over communism, the Western world finds itself in a deep crisis creating doubts about the cornerstone principles. This is determined by two major factors:

1. The democratic organisation of society is based on diversity of ideas and opinions, but, to work effectively, these opinions must lie within core principles accepted by the whole society. The last decade is marked by the erosion of these core principles and emergence of deep divisions. With the rise of new forms of socialism, the moderate left is drifting towards the far left; while a substantial fraction of the population is shifting from the conservatism of the moderate right to xenophobia of the far right. These polarised groups can no longer talk to (let alone understand) each other. These alarming trends are stimulated by some features of the information age and, most likely, by covert action of the principal opponents of the democratic tradition.

2. While the rise of China is usually quoted as the main factor weakening the West, this is not the economic development of this country alone but in conjunction with its recent drift towards autocracy and militarism that is the main problem. Post-communist China has originally introduced collegial governance that partially emulated the effects of democratic elections, but its recent shift towards autocracy predetermines its likely confrontation with the countries of democratic tradition. The development of high-tech segments in a large and militarised country unconditionally controlled by a single man is an inherent danger to the world.

Forsaking Western principles in favour of immediate profits is inevitably accompanied by a reduction of educational standards, bureaucratisation and corruption, gradual loss of economic competitiveness, and growing disagreements within and between Western countries.

Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Russian-Ukrainian war is yet another episode of the historical conflict between autocratic and democratic traditions. The autocratic tradition, which is deeply embedded into Russian history and collective consciousness, is trying to destroy its major opponent --- the democratic tradition that was followed in Ukraine over many centuries (both the history of Eastern Europe and the history of the world had a few similar episodes in the past). This war is not an ethnic conflict where people are born and locked into a certain cultural tradition and cannot choose sides. In this conflict, people align with and fight for the side that corresponds to their worldviews irrespective of the ethnic origins of their ancestors.

The West, which was gradually losing its own values and principles, is surprised to observe a spectacular display of efficacy of these values in modern conditions. Self-organisation of Ukrainian citizenry, motivation and determination of its army, unification of a democratic society in its fight for freedom contrast with the inaptness and inhumane cruelty of Russian invaders. Ukraine not only defends the West against yet another Reich but also opens the doors for a renaissance of Western values. It is not a surprise that after some initial shock and hesitation, the West is jumping on board to help Ukraine. While every country has its own traditions and interests, the most important point here is that Ukraine shares its core values of democracy and freedom with the Western civilisation. It is this key point that ultimately determines the unwavering character of Western support for Ukraine. If Russia and Ukraine merely had an ethnic conflict, the West would be much less interested in its outcomes --- there are far too many such conflicts in the world.

Why did Russia attack Ukraine? While Russia derived its name from the old Ukraine (Rus), the importance of this and other historical totems and myths should not be overestimated --- these may serve as excuses but are not the reasons for Russian aggression and these issues are not considered to be significant in the modern world. When and if Russia wishes to isolate itself from Ukraine, it will simply derive its name and statehood myths from old Novgorod instead of old Kyiv. Russian archetypical idioms (e.g. “brotherhood and triunity of Eastern Slavs”, “Russian world”) should not be taken seriously --- they merely reflect Russian intentions but do not cause them.

Five centuries ago, the Muscovite principality inherited extreme autocratic forms from the collapsing Golden Horde, and its initial growth was based on suppression and subjugation of democratic traditions, often using inhumanly cruel, genocidal means (e.g. destruction of Novgorod). This state could grow extensively but was incapable of modernisation and development and, like all empires of this nature, was destined to have a short life span. The subsequent voluntary union of democratic Ukraine and autocratic Russia was a historically unusual step, which can perhaps be explained by a common religion. This union underpinned the key success of Russia, bringing active and educated Ukrainians to serve the tsardom. The unbridgeable cultural gap between Muscovites and Europeans was bridged by Ukrainians allowing for the subsequent transfer of knowledge and technology. The Muscovite state was partially Europeanised to grow into the enormous Russian empire, which nevertheless preserved its traditional autocracy, sometimes in a relatively moderate and sometimes in an extreme form.

The current crisis is yet another relapse of the extreme forms of Muscovite autocracy and its relentless struggle against the democratic tradition. Like five centuries ago, Russia is in a state that is prohibitive of any substantial progress and development and, like five centuries ago, Russia is seeking a way out in imperial expansion that includes the acquisition of Ukraine as its principal step. With stubborn persistence, Russia is trying to replicate its past imperial successes but the strategy that was functional then cannot succeed now. Acquisition of Ukraine by Russia is no longer possible.

Concluding remarks. Ukraine must prevail in this conflict – there is no any other way. This victory will become a unique opportunity for Ukraine to convert its democratic traditions into efficient and stable institutions that can ensure prompt reconstruction and development of the country. Judicial reform seems to be the first principal step in this conversion. While Ukraine has an educated population, a growing intellectual elite and dedication to success, it also has a history of squandering opportunities. Ukraine’s major challenge is to become a cultural and intellectual centre attracting creative people from the region and around the world. At this stage, Ukraine has a predominately defensive mentality that is focused on protecting its identity and existence. This fits the present conditions, but to be successful in the long run, this narrow mentality needs to be replaced by a vision that leads the region by example and offers a viable, attractive alternative to the imperial thinking of the past. Ukraine needs to understand and come to terms with its own internal strength but, unlike Russia, keep learning and progressing.

In Russia, the remission of the acute form of the imperial disease called Rushism will need to be followed by immediate measures that can ensure world security and eliminate aggressive wars in the future. Russia will have to bear responsibility for its actions. The strength of Russian science and culture is universally recognised in the world but this recognition can only increase the responsibility --- the country must have understood the implications of its actions. While some changes in Russia are likely to be relatively quick, the question of long-term political dynamics will remain. The result of many years of the Rushist propaganda can be reversed only over time. In this context, the positive example of democratic and successful Ukraine must be instrumental.

The victory of the democratic tradition over extreme, fascist forms of autocracy is destined to lead to a renaissance of Western values. This is likely to involve returning to more traditional and more inclusive interpretations of these values in the countries of the Western tradition, as well as increasing the prestige and attractiveness of democratic forms of governance in many countries around the world.

References:

1. A. Y. Klimenko. Complex competitive systems and competitive thermodynamics. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A*, 20120244, 2013.

DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL UNDER MIGRATION CONDITIONS**Marenichenko Valerii**

Associate Professor of the Department of Public Management and Law,
PhD in Public Administration
CIHE "Dniprovska Academy of Continuing Education" (Dnipro), Ukraine
marenichenkov@gmail.com
ORCID 0000-0002-0183-13

Since the beginning of the war, our country has faced new challenges for science, as there is a massive internal and external migration of scientific personnel, which affect the development of scientific and technological potential.

Global trends show that intellectual migration is a special threat to the socio-economic development of the country and sustainable development of society, as the formation of highly qualified scientific personnel and increasing scientific and technological potential is one of the most important factors of progress.

The young Ukrainian state is actively fighting for its rightful place in the international environment. Intellectual resources play a significant role in this struggle. The loss of these resources can cause and create strategic danger and threat to national character.

Today, there is an intellectual migration in the world, which is formed on the basis of mechanisms for attracting a scientifically active population on an international scale. In Ukraine, these mechanisms are applied to a much lesser extent than in developed countries. Ukraine needs skilful state regulation of the scientific potential development with advanced and promising mechanisms such as «brain gain» and «brain circulation», taking into account the internal (citizens) and external (migrants) potential.

In recent time the scientific potential of Ukraine has been decreasing. Aging of scientific potential is accompanied by a decline in research infrastructure and processes of «brain drain», which leads to the migration of promising scientists.

Issues of analysis and research of migration processes, reemigration, development of scientific and entrepreneurial potential were undertaken by such Ukrainian and foreign scientists as M. Belne, P. Bidwell, R. Bruga, A. Gaiduckiy, R. Daugeliene, F. Docquier, K. Inkson, S. Carr, O. Lyashenko, S. MacAlias, R. Marcinkeviciene, C. Normand, E. Tyrrell, S. Thomas, K. Thorn, N. Humphries, Y. Champanyuk.

At the same time, issues of state regulation of the development of science in Ukraine remain based on analysis and creation of mechanisms for the return and cooperation with the scientific potential of the migration population and the Ukrainian diaspora in other countries.

Using the mechanisms of «brain gain» and «brain circulation», a brand of transparent environment for the development of science, technology and business will be formed in Ukraine, which will not only save but also increase the latest scientific and technological achievements.

THE INCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CIVIL DEFENCE ON THE UKRAINIAN EXAMPLE

Nagel Hannes

Master of Social Sciences (Public Governance)

ORCID: 0000-0001-7748-4064

NGO Crisis Research Center, crisis researcher

Email: hannes.nagel@kruk.ee

It is essential to note that the extent of the resistance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, especially of the civil society, has (positively) surprised the Western world to a great extent (Masuhr & Zogg, 2022, p. 2). The transfer of military expertise and good practices from the West to Ukraine may be reversed in many aspects. Regardless of the outcome of the war, the tractor pulling away a tank has become one of the symbols of the resistance of democratic civil society and civil protection, as have Molotov cocktails. It shows how different and important role a civilian who does not take part in active combat can play in modern wars (Wasielewski, 2022, p. 8). Being at the same time a vulnerable party (Foore & Williams, 2018), whose security and evacuation from the battle zone unintentionally affects the activities and options of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is an important new resource, the involvement of which is both an advantage and an ethical issue at the same time.

Despite the brutality of the war, the Ukrainian state and society are acquiring vital new knowledge that may have faded in the West. Russia's deliberate attack on the civilian population outside the battlefields, but also in Western Ukraine via air and missile strikes (Beaumont & Hardin, 2022) shows the importance of civil protection in a crisis situation, the extent and depth of which is indefinite. Civilian defense in action also means supplying the people with food, shelter, medicine, water etc. As they are not evacuated, the threat to their life and wellbeing is high. Only thing that lowers the threat is preparation, communication and cooperation with the internal security units, national and local defense forces.

As civil defense is focused on safeguarding a vision of ensuring resilience, the continuation of social life or bare survival in the face of total war, the future is rarely a bright one (Cronqvist, *et al.*, pp 235). However, the desirable is to find a way to handle collectively the demanding threats to society (*ibid.*, p. 236), which, in the case of Ukraine, is to fight back using all available means. This inevitably involves the unplanned involvement of civilians in the conflict, deliberate involvement as well as spontaneous grassroots intervention by citizens themselves, with a degree of awareness of the dangers they may face. With the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine a number of relevant questions arise that require adequate answers and solutions to which in Estonia today, given the state of the national civil defense system and its capabilities, there either limited or inadequate answers:

1. What can we learn and adopt from the Ukrainian example of using civil defense as an effective tool in the 21st century warfare?
2. What issues have arisen from the Ukrainian example of practical civil defense?
3. Whose concern is civil protection – local, central government, or the armed forces?
4. How to ensure adequate resources for civil protection at a time when financial resources are scarce?
5. How to raise awareness of the importance of civil protection and the importance of the individual in its successful implementation?
6. How to engage citizens of the European Union who perhaps are too used to safety and social benefits, to play an active role in civil protection?
7. Should civil protection become one of the compulsory subjects at secondary school level to ensure a comprehensive preparedness and understanding of crisis preparedness, response and

recovery in the future?

References:

1. Beaumont, P. & Hardin, L. 2022. Russia widens attack with airstrikes on western Ukraine cities, The Guardian, March 11, 2022. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/11/russia-widens-attack-with-airstrikes-on-western-ukraine-cities>
2. Cronqvist, M., Farbøl, R. & Sylvest, C. 2022. Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe. Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Survival and Preparedness. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 235–236.
3. Foore, N. & Williams, M. 2018. Civilians and Warfare in World History, (1st ed) Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd.
4. Masuhr, N. & Zogg, B. 2022. The War in Ukraine: First Lessons, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 301, p. 2. Retrieved from: <https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse301-EN.pdf>
5. Wasielewski, P. 2022. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, p. 8. Retrieved from: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/appraising-the-war-in-ukraine-and-likely-outcomes>

THE COMEBACK OF THE INTERMARIUM?

Nagel Hannes

Master of Social Sciences (Public Governance)

ORCID: 0000-0001-7748-4064

NGO Crisis Research Center, crisis researcher

Email: hannes.nagel@kruk.ee

The consequences of the second Russian aggression in Ukraine will change the world in many aspects from international law to nuclear safety, but also locally from regional cooperation to integration. Although Ukraine has applied to become a member of the European Union and envisioned NATO membership, it is perhaps more relevant today to focus on the pre-membership period. In this period, key decisions and events will take place, which will take Ukraine closer to being fully integrated to the European and Western family.

Nevertheless, it is not an easy road; various reforms are a pre-requisite of becoming a full member. Estonia's experience is no exception – the process of integration and reforms can be measured in a decade – as both were finalized only in 2004. Regardless of how Ukraine rebuilds itself, with the help of some new Marshall Plan 2.0 or Russian capital seized in Western banks for reparations, an enormous task remains ahead after the war has ended and the territorial integrity of Ukrainian has been restored.

It is important to emphasize this because this is a specific process, which needs support on all levels of the society. Ukraine needs assistance in going through these systemic processes, so gaining membership could be as smooth and efficient as possible. For that, I propose to reconsider an old idea from the 20th century, which was constructed by Józef Piłsudski after World War I (Kushnir, 2021, p. 11), the concept of Intermarium.

The Intermarium (Latin for "Between-Seas") was a Polish post-World War I geopolitical concept that envisaged an alliance of countries reaching from the Baltic Sea over the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea that would serve as a third power bloc between Germany and Russia (Laruelle & Rivera, 2019, p. 8). Like the French *cordon sanitaire* against Germany from the interwar years, it was a product of its time, an extraordinary solution to an extraordinary problem that is centuries old. A federation as a counterweight to both Russian and German imperialism (Cisek 2002, p. 47, Spero 2004, p. 36). Since the concept never materialized due to many issues of which the most prominent was the fact that no East European country wanted to find itself under Polish leadership (Leschnik, 2010, p. 32), little attention from scholars has been paid to its early history (Laruelle & Rivera, 2019, p. 3), with few exceptions (e.g. Dorril, 2000; Aarons & Loftus, 1991; Levy, 2006). Over the last decade, the idea has gained once more attention, most notably among Western strategic circles (Laruelle & Rivera, 2019, p. 13–14).

The Intermarium idea actually belongs to the long genealogy of geopolitical concepts looking for and promoting a Central and Eastern European unity. The original concept foresaw a federation of independent states, centered dominantly on Poland (Debo, 1992, p. 59), to oppose both the German and Russian imperialism (Billington, 2011, p. 432). It has since been regularly revived in evolving contexts and finds itself reactivated today.

Although Intermarium was destined to fail at the time of its inception for purely pragmatic reasons, the idea has remained according to Polegkyi (2021, p. 42) an integral part of the Polish geopolitics. Furthermore, as Kushnir (2021, p. 22) points out its weaknesses were economic inefficiency and non-institutionalized framework, which was not able to assure any significant achievements in military and defense cooperation.

Following the second Russian invasion of Ukraine, unlike in 2014, there are signs that the former Polish centered concept could become a reality, albeit on different terms and on different grounds. Yet, it would be still driven by the need to provide a countervailing force against an

imperialism, this time exclusively from the East that is determinedly seeking revenge for the so-called '*greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century*' (Putin, 2005) and demands to return to the 1997 NATO borders. These goals alone pose existential threat to democracies and cultures of East Europe.

According to Nałęcz (2019, pp. 15–18), if Intermarium were to be formed, it would require at least the free will to form a functional federated organization with defensive capabilities, a weakened Russia and approval of the West – conditions that never co-existed in the twentieth century (Kushnir, 2021, p. 22), unlike now. Paradoxically, it is not the Russian imperialism that threatens the emergence of such a transnational, broadly inclusive, values-based alliance, but a possible reliance on a single leader, which according to Chakravartt (2022) would be best suited (again) for Poland. That would repeat the mistakes of the past because the desire for integration must be common to all, based on the principle of equal treatment – there should not be difference between a small and big countries, as the joint core values and goals are universal to them – to maintain democracy, freedom and security.



Fig 1. Visualization of the proposed value-based Intermarium, which could accelerate Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and mitigate the challenges it may entail. Source: Own elaboration, created with mapchart.net

Despite Ukraine gaining most benefit from such possible scenario today, the eastward threat is shared throughout the region (Tycner 2020). Even though there is no guarantee how Intermarium would actually work out or who the exact members would be, something can still be noted. It would be greatly different compared to the post-World War I proposal, limited in my opinion mainly to the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine (see Fig 1), yet with a greater chance of succeeding. Namely, there are strong historical reasons, which the Russian foreign policy continue to uphold in East Europe that also keep the Intermarium proposal relevant. Complementing as a whole both the future (larger) European Union and NATO through stronger regional ties and alliances.

At the same time there is also a possibility that any Intermarium related grouping, could function only a limited time being a jump board towards to full integration, where sharing the experiences (as well as the pains) of accession between nations that understand the regional dialect of the geopolitical language unambiguously, would help to speed up and smooth the process. As

Estonia's experience shows, this can be followed by an era where strong alliances of the past are replaced by more thematic debates and negotiations depending on the needs of the politics of the day – countries vote on decisions within EU institutions often by blocs depending on the issue and their national positions. They have done so in the past and probably will continue to do so in the future. In this case, it would be already up to Ukraine to choose with whom to side on one issue or another.

The Ukrainian desire and request to be accepted and become part of the greater and real European security (NATO) and economic (EU) framework which was identical for Estonia, is still in the interest of all before mentioned parties. Let us put it bluntly, without the achievement of these strategic objectives, Ukraine would remain a perpetual periphery of Europe, with its attendant threats and constraints. On a European scale, it would be a true *geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century* – to be so close and yet so far away, in the corner of the European waiting room.

References:

1. Aarons, M. & Loftus, J. 1991. *Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets*, London: William Heinemann.
2. Billington, J. H. 2011. *Fire in the Minds of Men*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, p. 432.
3. Chakravartt, S. 2022. Could the War in Ukraine be a Revival of Polish Geopolitical Ambitions?, *Modern Diplomacy*, March 16, 2022. Retrieved from: <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/03/16/could-the-war-in-ukraine-be-a-revival-of-polish-geopolitical-ambitions>
4. Debo, R. K. 1992. *Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1992*, McGill-Queen's Press, p. 59.
5. Dorril, S. 2000. *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service*, New York: Free Press.
6. Janusz Cisek (26 September 2002). *Kościuszko, we are here!: American pilots of the Kościuszko Squadron in defense of Poland, 1919-1921*. McFarland & Company, Inc., p. 47.
7. Kushnir, O. 2021. The Intermarium as a Pivotal Geopolitical Buzzword. *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 8(2), p. 11, 22.
8. Laruelle, M. & Rivera, E. 2019. Imagined Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe: The Concept of Intermarium, *IERES Occasional Papers*, 1, p. 3, 8, 13–14. Retrieved from: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/laruelle-rivera-ieres_papers_march_2019_1.pdf
9. Leschnik, H. 2010. *Die Außenpolitik der Zweiten polnischen Republik: "Intermarium" und "Drittes Europa" also Konzepte der polnischen Außenpolitik unter Außenminister Józef Beck von 1932 bis 1939*, Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. Müller, p. 32.
10. Levy, J. 2006. *The Intermarium: Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism*, (PhD dissertation), University of Cincinnati. Retrieved from: https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ucin1147397806&disposition=attachment
11. Nałęcz, D. 2019. The Evolution and Implementation of the Intermarium Strategy in Poland: A Historical Perspective. In *Intermarium: The Polish-Ukrainian Linchpin of the Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation*, Kushnir, O. (ed.), Cambridge: Scholars Publishing, pp. 15–18.
12. Polegkyi, O. 2021. The Intermarium in Ukrainian and Polish Foreign Policy Discourse, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 8(2), p. 42.
13. Putin, V. V. 2005. *Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации*. 25 апреля, Президент России. Retrieved from: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931>
14. Spero, J. B. 2004. *Bridging the European divide: middle power politics and regional security dilemmas*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 36.
15. Tycner, A. 2020. *Intermarium in the 21st Century*, Institute of World Politics, December 23, 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.iwp.edu/articles/2020/12/23/intermarium-in-the-21st-century>

THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ON UKRAINE'S AGRICULTURE

Vacariu Oana-Andreea

Academia de Politie 'Al. I. Cuza'

vacariuoana@yahoo.com

Abstract. Over time, agriculture has been one of the most important branches of human survival. It has undergone changes due to the evolution of society and technology, but the end result remains the same: food procurement, whether we are talking about crops, horticulture or animal husbandry. Ukraine is one of the world's leading exporters of cereals and vegetable oils and a major exporter of wheat, managing to meet the needs of its own country, as well as to enter the market. The objectives of this research are to illustrate the important role of Ukraine's role in supporting the needs of international exports and the crisis of the Russian-Ukrainian war with long-term consequences in the field of agriculture and beyond.

Keywords: agriculture, Ukraine, war, cereals, international exports.

1. Introduction

At almost 80 years after the end of the Second World War, the democratic society is once again witnessing the outbreak of a war in a democratic, free country, the integrity of which should be guaranteed, Ukraine; the Russia-Ukraine war.

Globally, Ukraine is the world's largest producer of oil (<https://economedia.ro/impactul-razboiului-din-ucraina-in-agricultura-cererea-in-crestere-pentru-produsele-romanesti-si-investitii-in-dezvoltarea-agriculturii.html#.YmPyWdpBxPY>) and sunflower and the 5th largest exporter of wheat.

Although Ukraine is not yet a member of the European Union (although it wants to, and the first steps were taken in this regard even during the war by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski by signing the application for membership of the European Union in 28 february 2022, four days after invasion of the country by Russian troops), it signed an association and free trade agreement with the European Union, which entered into force in 2017, representing the main instrument of rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union. The agreement promotes the following aspects: in-depth political relations, stronger economic ties and respect for common values.

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/>) Economic Area of the Agreement. It provides a framework for modernizing Ukraine's economic and trade relations.

Since spring 2014, Ukraine has embarked on an ambitious reform programme (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eap_factsheet_ukraine_eng_web.pdf), aiming to stabilise its economy and improve the livelihoods of its citizens. Priority reforms include the fight against corruption, reform of the judiciary, constitutional and electoral reforms, improvement of the business climate and energy efficiency, as well as reform of public administration, including decentralisation.

The contact with the European Union has allowed Ukraine to export much more easily and easily, cereals, sunflower and sunflower oil; the partnership being beneficial for each party involved, both for the European Union and for Ukraine.

2. The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war in Ukraine's agriculture

The impact of the war is very strong both nationally and globally.

Ukraine has shown the world that it is a country of brave people ready to defend its territory and its citizens.

Here, even in the field of agriculture, it does not give up and despite its precarious situation, its agriculture is constantly growing and developing.

According to Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Agriculture Taras Vysotsky was quoted by Reuters saying (<https://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-agricultura-25468458-ucraina-400-000-hectare-insamantate-culturi-primavara-pana-acum-10-mai-mult-decat-aceeasi-perioada-anului-trecut.htm>) that “until Thursday, Ukrainian farmers sowed about 400,000 hectares of various spring crops, a tenth more than the same date last year, despite the Russian invasion”.

With all the perseverance shown by Ukrainian farmers this month, Ukrainian agricultural officials said that the area for sowing spring crops in 2022 could be reduced by more than half from last year, to about 7 million hectares, compared to the 15 million hectares expected before invasion.

We can say that the difference is colossal and that considering the given conditions it still represents a success.

3. The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war for the world

In addition to the critical situation created by the attack on the security and peace of the world, if the invasion don't stop the world food prices will continue to rise, by missing one of the most important producers in the field of cereals, namely wheat and sunflower.

Also another vulnerability for export is the Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, some of which are affected (Mariupol or Berdyans - Sea of Azov), and others face a blockade generated by the Russian armed forces (Kherson or Odessa).

The situation is so serious that the European Parliament adopted a resolution (<https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-meetyourmep-25456834-unda-soc-razboiului-din-ucraina-despre-care-nu-vorbit-pana-acum-document-oficial-european-arata-perspectiva-sumbra.htm>) on Thursday stipulating the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security, both inside and outside the EU member states.

In order to show the extent of the situation, the document mentions the area of Ukraine 11% of the world wheat market, 16% of the barley market, 15% of the corn market, 16% of the rapeseed market, 50% of the sunflower oil market, 9 % of trade in sunflower seeds and 61% of trade in sunflower cake.

Ukraine's crisis also has led to an explosion in fertilizer prices.

4. Conclusions:

Given all the above, we can say that the situation is critical, even if we hope that in the end this conflict will end in a positive way that will allow Ukraine to recover or recover and to recover the losses suffered; the impact of the war was devastating for it, on all levels, economic, social, cultural.

The whole world exclaims “Stand with Ukraine!” in these difficult months of war for the people of Ukraine and a war against democratic values, human rights and peace.

References:

1. <https://economy.ro/impactul-razboiului-din-ucraina-in-agricultura-cererea-in-crestere-pentru-produsele-romanesti-si-investitii-in-dezvoltarea-agriculturii.html#.YmPyWdpBxPY>;
2. <https://www.startupcafe.ro/fonduri-europene/cadru-temporar-ajutoare-de-stat-2022-uniunea-europeana-firme-razboi-rusia-ucraina>;
3. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/>;
4. <https://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-agricultura-25468458-ucraina-400-000-hectare-insamantate-culturi-primavara-pana-acum-10-mai-mult-decat-aceeasi-perioada-anului-trecut.htm>;
5. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eap_factsheet_ukraine_eng_web.pdf.

WAR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE: CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN

Velika Ruta

Daugavpils University, Daugavpils, Latvia

e-mail: rutavelika@gmail.com

The international order and geopolitical processes in the world are strictly regulated with the aim of maintaining peace, ensuring security and promoting cooperation and national development.

The UN Charter establishes a legal mechanism that ensures a fair balance of rights. One of the most important principles is the maintenance of peace and the prohibition of unjustified acts of war [1].

On February 24, 2022, Russia violated all the foundations of international security and gained the condemnation of most of the world for its actions.

Society has united considerably, condemning the Russian war in Ukraine. UN General Assembly by a large majority adopted a resolution, expressing a categorical and unequivocal request to suspend ongoing military operations on Ukrainian territory [2].

On 16 March 2022, The International Court of Justice adopted an order immediately suspending the ongoing military operations on Ukrainian territory [3].

Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its people is an unwarranted and immoral act. Even the most skeptical scientists, researchers, politicians did not fully believe that Russia will lead a large-scale aggression against Ukraine.

It was hard to imagine that in the 21st century, the Russian Federation, under the pretext of saving the Russian world, would illegally cross the border of a sovereign state and commit cruel crimes aimed at destroying the country and its people.

Destroyed homes, schools, hospitals, continuous humanitarian crises over several days, the sound of an anti-missile system, famine, fear, death and the smell of blood are what Russian soldiers brought to Ukraine and its people.

Assessing events Bucha [4], Mariupol [5],[6], Kharkiv [7], Hostomel [8], Makarov [9], Irpin [10] and in many other Ukrainian cities and villages, there is widespread genocide against the Ukrainian population, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948 [11]. At the moment, no one has the moral right to speak evasively about the aggression against the Ukrainian people, given the extensive and detailed information provided about the war in Ukraine.

On April 21, 2022, the Latvian Saeima has expressed support for the statement that the aggression of the Russian Federation and war crimes in Ukraine are genocide against the Ukrainian people [12].

And, in the author's opinion, such an example should follow all the countries of the world, the illegal actions taken by the Russian Federation must not go unpunished or disregarded. This is the moment when you have to have a strong position.

How does Russia's war against Ukraine affect the interests and rights of children? There is only one answer - in the most direct and cruel way. Every day you can hear about unimaginable war crimes against the most vulnerable group - children. More than 500 children have died and been injured in Ukraine, according to official figures released by a Ukrainian prosecutor [13].

Since the first day of the war, children's lives in Ukraine have changed by 180 degrees. Children have experienced the death of loved ones, constant fear, the destruction of their homes, and experienced emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.

Article 6 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that the child has an inalienable right to life [14]. It is not possible to describe in words how a parent feels when his child is brutally and coldly killed before their eyes.

The mass media constantly writes, interviews the parents and relatives of the deceased children in order to obtain evidence of the crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Hundreds of children have been deprived of the opportunity to grow up by the Russian Federation, have taken away the future [15],[16],[17],[18],[19]. Not only were the children killed, but they were also used as shields. Ukraine's human rights ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova said, that "Cases of using children as cover are recorded in Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia *oblasts* [regions]."[20] These facts prove not only the violations of Article 6 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but also the genocide perpetrated against the Ukrainian people by the Russian Federation.

Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that every child who has the right to make his or her views known has the right to freedom of expression in all matters affecting him[14].

Russia is currently launching a massive disinformation campaign to influence public opinion in two ways, firstly, convincing that everything covered in the world media about Ukraine is „fake news” and, secondly, by banning freedom of expression and criminalizing responsibility for turning against the ruling elite.

For example, in Russia, a „Defenders of Peace” lesson was organized in schools to mislead students and convince them of the noble cause of Russia's military action [21]. Russia has banned the use of popular Internet sites such as TikTok, Instagram. In addition, as a matter of urgency, amendments were adopted to the Criminal Code establishing responsibility for making false information about Russian army, with liability of up to 15 years in prison [22].

Russia has violated the provisions of Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and has created a legal instrument that significantly restricts young people's freedom of expression and access to comprehensive information.

Children's rights are specially protected and given special care, because only adults depend on how successful and meaningful the child's development will be.

International and national law dogmatically prohibit the emotional, physical and sexual abuse of children. It also contains a particularly complex interdisciplinary nature.

Article 34 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that children shall be protected from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse [14].

Information about horrific cases of child rape in Ukraine has overwhelmed the public [23],[24] for countless cases where mothers of children were raped in the presence of children [25], [26], talks of Russian Federation soldiers with relatives in Russia were intercepted, revealing both the facts of sexual violence and support for such activities [27].

The Russian Federation's army is currently undergoing absolute demoralization, supported by the ruling elite of the Russian Federation, which makes them complicit in every case of killing and rape [28].

As a result of the Russian war, Ukraine states, infrastructure, economy and society as a whole have suffered. There is no excuse for the devastation wrought by the Russian army on Ukrainian children. Society has now acquired children who are deeply emotionally and physically traumatized, which will undoubtedly affect and radically change their future quality of life. These losses cannot be monetised, cannot be compensated for and it is not possible to accept the cruelty that has been done.

In order to achieve a fair result, it is essential not to remain silent about such cases, to collect and record evidence for the purpose of bringing the perpetrators to justice.

References:

1. United Nations Charter. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7> (accessed: April 2022).
2. Ukraine: General Assembly passes resolution demanding aid access, by large majority. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632> (accessed: April 2022)

3. 16 March 2022 Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed: April 2022)
4. 'It was like a movie': recaptured Bucha recounts violence of Russian invasion <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/bucha-violence-invasion-russia-ukraine> (accessed: April 2022)
5. Russia Broadens Mariupol Assault as Signs of Stalemate Take Shape <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/20/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-mariupol.html> (accessed: April 2022)
6. Mariupol Maternity Hospital Destroyed By Russian Air Strike, Triggering Global Horror, Outrage. <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-hospital-bombed-russia/31744934.html> (accessed: April 2022)
7. Ukraine conflict: Russia bombs Kharkiv's Freedom Square and opera house . <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60567162> (accessed: April 2022)
8. Ukrainian soldier on the battle that "changed the course of the war," and what he fears Russia will do next. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-news-russia-war-hostomel-battle-putin-chemical-weapons-donbas/> (accessed: April 2022)
9. Ukraine-Russia War: Russian Shelling Kills 13 In Makarov Region Despite Ceasefire; 5 Saved. <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/ukraine-russia-war-russian-shelling-kills-13-in-makarov-region-despite-ceasefire-5-saved-articleshow.html> (accessed: April 2022)
10. Battle for Irpin: Russian forces pushed out of Kyiv suburb. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60959667> (accessed: April 2022)
11. 9 December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf (accessed: April 2022)
12. Saeima paziņojumā atzīst – Krievija īsteno genocīdu pret ukraiņu tautu . <https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/saeima-pazinojuma-atzist--krievija-isteno-genocidu-pret-ukrainu-tautu.a453263/> (accessed: April 2022)
13. More Than 500 Ukrainian Children Killed Or Injured Since Russia Invaded, Ukraine's Prosecutor's Office Says. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2022/04/12/more-than-500-ukrainian-children-killed-or-injured-since-russia-invaded-ukraines-prosecutors-office-says/?sh=7fb8af0813f2> (accessed: April 2022)
14. 20 November 1989, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. <http://likumi.lv/ta/lv/starptautiskie-ligumi/id/1150> (accessed: April 2022)
15. Ukraine children: Killed as he escaped, Elisei is one of 200 child victims . <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61146084> (accessed: April 2022)
16. Two children injured, two adults killed in hospital attack in southern Ukraine. <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/two-children-injured-two-adults-killed-hospital-attack-southern-ukraine> (accessed: April 2022)
17. They Died by a Bridge in Ukraine. This Is Their Story. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/europe/ukraine-family-perebyinis-kyiv.html>
18. 300 Killed in Russian Airstrike on Theater in Mariupol, Local Officials Say. <https://time.com/6160777/mariupol-theater-300-killed/> (accessed: April 2022)
19. 50, Including 5 Children, Killed In Rocket Attack At Ukraine Train Station. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-war-ukraine-civilians-evacuation-russian-missile-attack-on-train-station-kills-39-people-in-east-ukraine-2871157> (accessed: April 2022)
20. Ukrainian children used as 'human shields' near Kyiv, say witness reports . <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/02/ukrainian-children-used-as-human-shields-near-kyiv-say-witness-reports> (accessed: April 2022)

21. Минпросвещения РФ анонсировало всероссийский открытый урок, где школьникам расскажут об «освободительной миссии» в Украине (2022). <https://meduza.io/news/2022/03/02/minprosvescheniya-rf-anonsirovalo-vserossiyskiy-otkrytyy-urok-gde-shkolnikam-rasskazhut-ob-osvoboditelnoy-missii-v-ukraine> (accessed: April 2022)
22. Госдума приняла закон об уголовной ответственности за фейки о российской армии <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60615902> (accessed: April 2022)
23. Russian invaders rape even babies in Ukraine – Zelensky. <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3455518-russian-invaders-rape-even-babies-in-ukraine-zelensky.html> (accessed: April 2022)
24. Ukraine conflict: 'Russian soldiers raped me and killed my husband' <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61071243> (accessed: April 2022)
25. Mothers raped in front of children in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims in UN address. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1SdArv2JJ4> (accessed: April 2022)
26. Sexual Violence and the Ukraine Conflict. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ukraine-Rape-As-A-Weapon-of-War-April-2022.pdf> (accessed: April 2022)
27. „Украинских баб насилуй”. Война десантника Быковского. <https://www.svoboda.org/a/ukrainskih-bab-nasiluy-voyna-desantnika-bykovskogo/31801593.html> (accessed: April 2022)
28. Putin gives honorary title to Russian brigade accused of war crimes in Bucha <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/19/europe/russia-bucha-brigade-honorary-title-putin-intl/index.html> (accessed: April 2022)

СТАНОВИЩЕ ЖІНКИ В УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ ТА РОСІЙСЬКІЙ ТРАДИЦІЙНИХ КУЛЬТУРАХ: ЗВИЧАЙ СНОХАЦТВА

Войтович Н.М.

кандидат історичних наук, доцент,
доцент кафедри історії України, економічної теорії та туризму
Львівський національний університет ветеринарної медицини
та біотехнологій імені С. З. Гжицького

Сьогодні, під час російської агресії проти українців особливо важливо боронитися на усіх фронтах – військовому, економічному, інформаційному. Не менш важливим є культурно-історичний та науковий фронт.

Перед нападом на Україну Путін виступив із промовою, у якій зокрема переконував, що Україна не має право на державність, бо створив її буцімто Ленін, а українці та росіяни – це один «братський» народ з однією культурою. Трагедія у тому, що ці псевдонаукові твердження пропагуються століттями та підтримуються більшістю сучасного російського суспільства. Російська політична верхівка на чолі зі своїм президентом аж ніяк не бажає змиритися із втратою України - саме так вони трактують факт розпаду СРСР та існування незалежної Української держави. Заперечуючи наше право на власне буття, власну орієнтацію в світі, самостійну зовнішню політику, деякі російські шовіністичні патріоти не оминають нагоди застосувати сарказм щодо кодових маркерів української ідентичності. Інші ж, навпаки, - роблять компліменти нам, але лише як співтворцям російської держави, культури і мови. Саме через таку нібито «спільну культуру» поплічники імперського режиму бачать реальні підстави для спільного історичного та національного розвитку.

Проте якщо проаналізувати основні елементи не лише професійної, «високої», сучасної масової культури, а й традиційної народної, то виявиться, що належимо ми до різних світів та цінностей. І саме ці відмінності сьогодні зіткнулися й воюють на нашій землі. Різницю культур можемо простежити на прикладі аналізу шлюбно-сімейних відносин. Адже різноманітність умов (різниця в соціально-політичній та економічній системах) створила основу для відмінностей у способі життя та культурі обох народів, у їхніх шлюбно-сімейних традиціях. Історичні та етнографічні матеріали показують, якими різними були традиційна сім'я в українців та росіян; яким було ставлення до жінки в ній; фіксують російський звичай «снохатства» як приклад повністю безправного становища жінки.

Окремо слід виділити питання про позашлюбний секс та заборонені інтимні практики, серед яких – кровна і штучна спорідненість. Українська сім'я була невеликою, рано одружені діти відділялися від батьків, жили й господарювали окремо, тому підґрунтя для кровозмішання фактично не було. Натомість якраз у великих патріархальних сім'ях, типових для Росії, де вся влада і майнові ресурси зосереджувалися в руках голови родини - батька, а жінки не мали жодних прав, практикувалося снохатство - інтимні стосунки між свекром і невісткою.

Власне снохатство було досить поширеним у росіян. Справа у тому, що традиційно для українців характерною була мала сім'я [6]. У росіян, навпаки, одружені сини приводили дружин у хату свого ще молодого батька. Тож молоді дружини були абсолютно безправними і мали виконувати накази й забаганки не лише чоловіка, а й свекра, часто бувало, що й сексуальні. Цю тему досить добре дослідили російські етнографи [1].

Свого часу цією традицією на українських територіях цікавився Іван Франко, який підготував і надрукував статтю «Сліди снохатства в наших горах», де зазначав, що «звичай сей случается особливо там, де люди живут по патриархальному, великими сім'ями (...) й поки син доросте, сам заступає невістці мужа» [5, с. 101]. Покликаючись на описи подорожніх, Франко вказував, що подекуди це зафіксовано в українських Карпатах (зокрема,

на Гуцульщині), але «у нас, особливо на Підгір'ю, трапляються випадки снохачтва як одиничні случаи». У статті подано матеріал з дрогобицького повітового суду, де син скаржиться на батька у зв'язку з тим, що останній «береся до его жінки... Я як женився – то для себе, а не для тата» [5, с. 104)]. Водночас автор резюмував, що поширений цей неморальний звичай у росіян, де «женить батько свого сина ще хлопцем сімох, вісьмох або дев'ятох літ зі старшою дівчиною. Батько, котрого невісткою стала ся дівчина, живе з нею як муж з жінкою і має з нею нераз кілька дітей» [5, с. 103].

Це сповна підтверджують і російські матеріали й джерела: «Следует признать, что половая близость между главой крестьянской семьи (большаком) и снохой не была явлением исключительным, а для патриархального уклада сельского быта, в какой-то мере и обыденным. В ряде мест, где снохачество было распространено, этому пороку не придавали особого значения» [1, с. 55]; більше того, якщо такий зв'язок був розкритим, то винною вважалася виключно жінка, «которую ожидала жестокая расправа со стороны мужа. Жена была избита до полусмерти; волосы наполовину были вырваны, лицо превращено в один сплошной синяк, тело исципано, одежда изорвана в мелкие клочки, так что женщина очутилась на улице совсем нагая» [1, с. 57]. Однією із причин існування снохачтва російські історики вважають сезонні заробітки: «Снохачество здесь распространено потому, что мужья уходят на заработки, видятся с женами только два раза в год, свекор же остается дома и распоряжается по своему усмотрению. Пользуясь отсутствием сына (отход, служба), а иногда и в его присутствии, свекор принуждал сноху к половой близости. В ход шли все средства: и уговоры, и подарки, и посулы легкой работы. В ином случае уделом молодой становилась непосильная работа, сопровождаемая придирками, ругательствами, а нередко и побоями. Некоторые женщины пытались найти защиту в волостном суде, но, как правило, те устранялись от разбора таких дел [2]. Мабуть, тому українські жінки не дуже хотіли виходити заміж за російських чоловіків. Не просто так Тарас Шевченко написав: «Кохайтесь, чорнобриві, та не з москалями».

Власне українська жінка мала набагато більше прав, зокрема і майнових. Свідченням цього є материзна - майно, яке вона отримувала в посаг під час одруження чи у спадок від матері [3, с. 84]. Іван Франко писав, що українці «обходяться з своїми жінками далеко лагідніше й свободніше, ніж їх сусіди» [4, с. 210].

Отже, у ставленні до жінки українці та росіяни - це кардинально інші етноси із іншою системою традиційних цінностей. Тож концепції «єдиного рускава міра», сподіваємося, зовсім скоро не віритиме ніхто.

Список літератури:

- 1.Безгин В. Правовая культура русского села (вторая половина XIX - начало XX веков). Тамбов, 2012. 80 с.
- 2.Губанов Д. «Духовные скрепы». Инцест и проституция в Российской Империи. Режим доступа: http://crime.in.ua/statti/2014_10_25/snohachestvo (дата звернення: 06.04.2022).
3. Кісь О. Жінка в традиційній українській культурі (друга половина XIX - початок XX ст.) : монографія. Львів, 2012. 287 с.
4. Франко І. Жіноча неволя в руських піснях народних. *Франко І.Я. Зібрання творів: у 50 т.* Т. 26. Київ, 1980. С. 209-253.
- 5.Франко І. Сліди снохачтва в наших горах. *Житє і слово. Вістник літератури, історії і фольклору.* 1895. Т. 4. С. 101–104.
- 6.Чмелик Р. Мала українська селянська сім'я другої половини XIX – початку XX ст. (структура і функції). Львів : Інститут народознавства НАН України, 1999. 142 с.

КАХА БЕНДУКІДЗЕ: АНАЛІЗ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ МОДЕЛІ СУЧАСНОЇ УКРАЇНИ

Процай Ангеліна Миколаївна

студентка

Терещенко Костянтин Олександрович

викладач-методист

ВСП «Гірничий фаховий коледж Криворізького національного університету»

Каха Бендукідзе – видатний реформатор економіки Грузії в період президентства Саакашвілі. Погляди Кахи можна охарактеризувати як лібертаріанські, тобто він підтримує вільний ринок, радикальну приватизацію та дерегуляцію, а функції держави обмежує охороною правопорядку та оборони.

Перебуваючи в Україні у 2014 році, Бендукідзе перед студентами Києво-Могилянської академії проаналізував економічний та соціально-політичний стан сучасної України. Видатний реформатор зазначив неможливість проведення усіх необхідних реформ в країні.

Каха негативно висловлювався щодо ролі профспілок в період реформ через прагнення їх до монополії на об'єднання працівників та не підтримував застосування принципів японського стратегічного менеджменту Тойоти (метод бережливого виробництва), що передбачає залучення всіх співробітників підприємства до загального зниження непродуктивних витрат для підвищення ефективності виробництва [2, С.239]. Для цього метода менеджменту треба спочатку досягнути певного рівня управління, якого в Україні і Грузії ще немає. Більше того, Каха щодо реформування соціально-економічної системи в Україні зазначає, що на Сході України немає міліції як такої, яка має захищати людей. Тому спочатку треба забезпечити захист прав людини, а лише потім впроваджувати Lean Production. Видатний грузинський реформатор вважав, що економічні зміни в Україні повинні здійснюватися разом з соціально-політичними, але: «Я не побачив в очах більшості представників урядовців справжнього бажання реформувати країну. Бачив там бажання обиратися іще один раз, а займатися справжніми реформами – ні. І це мене дуже засмучує» [1]. Свої слова він пояснював тим, що українська революція не призвела до зміни політичної еліти і саме тому не була завершеною, а націоналістична риторика для консолідації нації є загрозою сепаратизму в частині країни.

К. Бендукідзе зазначав, що в Україні треба знизити податки, що буде сприяти збільшенню рівня зайнятості, отже призведе до зростання економіки. Розвиваючи свою думку щодо податкової системи, він заявив, що не підтримує ідею спеціального податку на мільярдерів, як успішних в бізнесі людей. Але їм не треба надавати державні субсидії на газ. Без них більшість олігархів зникне.

Бендукідзе заперечує сплати у Соціальний та Пенсійний фонди, які йдуть до бюджету і уряд саме з цього бюджету виплачує пенсії. Натомість, він пропонує універсальний бюджет, до якого йдуть усі кошти, які потім розподіляються відповідно до потреб країни: «Ця реформа зовсім не болюча для громадян. Болючою вона є лише для працівників Пенсійного фонду» [1]. Таким чином, зменшуються витрати на державних чиновників, кількість яких буде зменшена, а реформи будуть легше запроваджуватись.

Податкова система та боротьба з корупцією в Грузії можуть стати прикладом для України. Каха пропонує провести податкову амністію за умови обов'язкової сплати податків після неї. Порушників законів він пропонує жорстоко карати незалежно від суми вкраденого і народ буде дотримуватись законів та платити податки, які треба зменшити.

Негативно відносився автор грузинських реформ і до націоналізації майна порушників закону. У цьому випадку можуть з'явитися люди, що будуть націоналізувати

капітал конкурентів за певну плату. Тому багато залежить від реформування суддівської системи.

Серйозною перешкодою в проведенні реформ в Україні Каха вбачає у авторитеті політиків-популістів, які збільшують податки для збільшення соціальних виплат, проводять нереальну соціальну політику, а це призводить до зростання рівня бюрократії. В результаті народ не багатіє, але обирає ще більших популістів і економіка занепадає. Автор грузинського економічного дива не знає як подолати цю проблему, але її можна подолати завдяки зростанню рівня свідомості та освіченості громадян.

Ще однією проблемою для України є неефективне використання енергоносіїв в Україні. Каха навіть порівнює дешеві енергоносії з дешевим наркотиком і цим наркотиком є російський газ. Вихід простий: підняти ціну на газ для підприємств і вони самі стануть енергоефективнішими. Також Каха критично поставився до роботи уряду: спочатку рішення приймається, а потім скасовується (напр., розташування вікон у мікроавтобусах).

На думку К. Бендукідзе реформувати треба всі галузі економіки та державного життя, адже Україна повинна заплатити за 20-річний вибір політиків-популістів. Наприкінці свого інтерв'ю Каха підсумував необхідність таких змін: знищити бюрократію та велику кількість «папірців», збільшити експорт, який може потіснити китайські товари у Європі, ліквідувати субсидії для бізнесу та зайве регулювання, стабілізувати валюту за допомогою ринкових механізмів і приватизувати державну власність.

В цілому поради видатного грузинського економіста для України є дуже доречними, але Каха не зазначає роль освіти у розвитку національної свідомості сучасних українців, не критикує неефективне використання іноземних інвестицій в Україні та не знає як дати раду сепаратизму.

Список літератури:

1. Каха Бендукідзе: Я не побачив у більшості українських урядовців бажання реформувати країну / <http://www.gurt.org.ua/news/recent/21463/>.
2. Ткачук В.О. Застосування дієвих інструментів Lean Production у практиці підбору робітничих кадрів / <http://projects.dune-hd.com/bitstream/handle/2010/19448/237-245.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

НАЦІОНАЛЬНО-ПАТРІОТИЧНЕ ВИХОВАННЯ МАЙБУТНІХ ВЧИТЕЛІВ НА ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТТЯХ З АНГЛІЙСЬКОЇ МОВИ В УМОВАХ ВІЙНИ 2022

Романюк В.Л.

старший викладач,

Національний педагогічний університет імені М.П. Драгоманова
vikaromanjuk@gmail.com

Гладка І.А.

доцент,

Національний педагогічний університет імені М.П. Драгоманова
i.a.hladka@npu.edu.ua

Гончарова Т.В.

канд. філ. наук, доцент,

Національний педагогічний університет імені М.П. Драгоманова
tatiana.goncharowa@gmail.com

Україна постала нині перед головним ворогом людства, гуманізму, свободи – диким авторитаризмом Кремля, який розв'язав проти нашої вітчизни небачену жорстоку війну. З перших днів російського військового вторгнення керівництво та професорсько-викладацький склад Національного педагогічного університету імені М.П. Драгоманова, зокрема викладачі факультету іноземної філології, активізували увагу до національно-патріотичного виховання майбутніх учителів, які вже через декілька років понесуть цю державну ідеологію у школи і будуть виховувати нові покоління патріотів незалежної України.

Саме славний історичний досвід та майбутня велика перемога над агресором, що покажуть усьому світові нашу силу, згуртованість, організованість, відданість та безмежну любов до України, саме вони мають формувати сучасні підходи до національно-патріотичного виховання молоді.

Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій.

На теренах України першооснови патріотичного виховання були закладені ще в народній педагогіці – в легендах, казках, міфах, літописах, повчаннях, прислів'ях. Також ці питання хвилювали культурних, державних і громадських діячів, письменників: Нестора Літописця, Ярослава Мудрого, Іларіона, Володимира Мономаха, П.Орлика, Ф.Прокоповича, Г.Сковороду, Т.Шевченка, П.Куліша, Д.Чижевського, Лесю Українку, І.Франка, М.Грушевського, В.Винниченка, С.Рудницького. Багатогранні аспекти патріотичного виховання особистості знайшли своє відображення у працях педагогів Х.Алчевської, Г.Ващенка, О.Духновича, І.Огієнка, С.Русової, К.Ушинського, Я.Чепіги, які приділяли велику увагу вихованню любові до своєї землі, рідної мови, формуванню національної самосвідомості, поваги до історичного минулого.

А.Макаренко, В.Сухомлинський радили прищеплювати молоді високі почуття вірності й відданості Батьківщині, пошани до її трудівників. Психологічні засади патріотичного виховання досліджували П.Блонський, Л.Виготський, Г.Костюк, О.Леонтьєв, О.Петровський, І.Синиця, П.Якобсон. У сучасній педагогічній науці окремі аспекти патріотичного виховання розробляють О.Бандура, Н.Волошина, А.Капська, В.Неділько, Є.Пасічник, Б.Степанишин.

Як відомо, процес виховання – це система виховних заходів, які спрямовані на формування гармонійно розвиненої особистості [3, с. 3]. Сучасним пріоритетом національно-патріотичного виховання є формування ціннісного ставлення особистості до українського народу, держави, нації [1, с.160].

Одним із найважливіших напрямків організації виховної роботи викладачів іноземної мови є активне формування у майбутніх вчителів відчуття патріотизму, любові до

батьківщини та рідного краю. Як зазначав В. Сухомлинський, «виховання громадянина патріотом – це гармонія розуму, думки, ідей, почуттів, духовних поривів, вчинків» [4, с.16]. Патріотичне виховання покликане формувати у майбутнього вчителя високі моральні ідеали, почуття жертвовного служіння батьківщині, і все це як естафету вони повинні передавати наступним поколінням незалежної України [2, с.171].

Сьогодні викладачі кафедри методики викладання іноземних мов звертають увагу на посилення актуалізації та підвищення мотивації вивчення студентами історії України, країнознавства, культурології, сучасних подій, зокрема, іноземною мовою через читання, обговорення, інсценування автентичних текстів.

Національно-патріотична ідеологія, яку викладачі пропагують іноземною мовою, передбачає виховання майбутніх вчителів патріотами України, носіями духовних цінностей, сприйняття ідей гуманізму та демократизму. Таким чином, ми не тільки будемо продовжувати формувати мовленнєву компетентність у говорінні, а й будемо плекати національну особистість патріота, що сповідує ідеали національного відродження і працю задля процвітання батьківщини.

У березні 2022 року з початку відновленого навчального процесу ми активізували принципи єдності активних та інтерактивних методів виховання, досягаючи їх інтеграції в кожному виховному моменті на заняттях. Ми використовуємо такі методи, як бесіди, тематичні диспути та дискусії, «круглі столи», вікторини, ділові ігри, різні форми роботи з текстами. Вони безпосередньо пов'язані з тематикою національно-патріотичного виховання і покликані ознайомити майбутніх вчителів з найбільш яскравими сторінками нашої героїчної історії та сучасності.

Так, ми започаткували створення серії патріотично-виховних відео для майбутніх вчителів. І одним із перших став ролик про непереможну Українську армію.

Ми разом з магістрами під час асистентської практики на заняттях запропонували знайти і підготувати відповідну інформацію про нашу армію, етапи її становлення і героїчні кроки до перемоги. Заняття магістри проводили в формі круглого столу, де студенти обговорювали прочитане, ділилися думками з приводу існуючих подій, ситуації в їх містах та говорили про свій вклад в перемогу як волонтерів. Наступним етапом роботи була підготовка тексту для відеозапису і створення власне патріотичного ролику. Ролик вміщав в себе патріотичні пісні, фото наших захисників, відеоінформацію англійською мовою про Збройні Сили України, про наших студентів із тероборони та викладачів, які пішли на фронт. Цей ролик став першим кроком в серйозній, кропіткій роботі викладачів і студентів у воєнних умовах, в умовах дистанційного навчання щодо виховання патріотів України. Вже восени студенти 4 -5 курсів підуть на практику у школи країни і на позакласних заходах будуть використовувати наші ролики (а саме: всесвітня підтримка України; ЗСУ; волонтери України) для формування особистості, яка зорієнтована на національні цінності і яка прагне до процвітання демократичної, незалежної країни.

Висновки.

Таким чином, проаналізована діяльність та отриманий досвід кафедри методики викладання іноземних мов Національного педагогічного університету імені М.П. Драгоманова свідчать про те, що кафедра здійснює значну роботу із національно-патріотичного виховання майбутніх вчителів. Змістом цієї роботи є формування молодого покоління, зорієнтованого на національні цінності, процвітання демократичної, незалежної України, перемоги над злом, що несе у собі російський загарбник. Майбутні вчителі стають свідками героїчних подій на фронті, ще більше усвідомлюють свою приналежність до українського народу, проймаються відчуттям гордості до національної історії, культури, традицій.

Ми впевнені – Україна переможе. До того ж маємо надію, що сучасна освітня діяльність, зокрема, креативна, різнопланова, плідна робота з майбутніми вчителями сприятиме і нашій перемозі, майбутньому процвітанню.

Ми змінилися назавжди, відчуваємо відповідальність за кожне слово, думку, крок і, головне, за батьківщину, маємо це зберегти та передати майбутнім поколінням патріотів України.

Список літератури:

1. Вишневський О. І. Теоретичні основи сучасної української педагогіки. Посібник для студентів вищих начальних закладів. – Дрогобич: Коло, 2003.– 528 с.
2. Кухаренко П.М., Резнікова О.О. Формування громадської позиції сучасної молоді//Україна на зламі тисячоліть – 20 років незалежності (1991-2011): зб. наук. пр. /Редкол.: Кобець А.С. (відп. ред. та ін..) – Д.: Видавництво «Придніпров'я», 2011. – Вип. 3. – С.169-174.
3. Фіцула М. М. Педагогіка: навчальний посібник для студентів вищих педагогічних закладів освіти. – 3-тє вид., перероб і доп. – Тернопіль: Навчальна книга- Богдан, 2007 .–232 с.
4. Сухомлинський В. А. Родина в серце. – 2-є изд. – М: Молодая гвардия,1980. . – 175 с.

АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ ЗБЕРЕЖЕННЯ АРХІВНИХ ФОНДІВ В УМОВАХ ВІЙСЬКОВОГО ВТОРГНЕННЯ РОСІЇ В УКРАЇНУ

Хевзюк Т.М.

здобувачка другого (бакалаврського) рівня освіти

Кондратюк М.М.

старша викладачка кафедри документальних комунікацій та бібліотечної справи
Рівненський державний гуманітарний університет

Актуальність дослідження обумовлена заходами у сфері архівної справи України задля збереження архівними установами своїх фондів під час військового вторгнення Російської Федерації в Україну та проблемами, з якими вони стикаються. Об'єктами російської агресії стають не лише люди, військова та цивільна інфраструктура, але й культурна, меморіальна та документальна спадщина України, яка входить до складу світової спадщини.

Сьогодні російськими окупантами знищуються найцінніші фонди українських архівів. Найпершим архівом, який зазнав руйнувань, став Державний архів Харківської області, який пошкоджено під час обстрілів 10 березня 2022 р., однак, за словами голови Державної архівної служби України (Укрдержархів) А. Хромова, документні фонди цього архіву не постраждали [20].

Наступним окупанти знищили архів Служби безпеки України у м. Чернігів, у якому зберігалось приблизно 13 тисяч справ на репресованих українців, а також документи радянської спецслужби – накази, переписки, особові та агентурні справи XX ст. Це велика втрата для національної пам'яті, оскільки «частина українців уже ніколи не зможе дізнатися правду про своїх родичів, які були репресовані радянським режимом» [14].

Разом з тим російські війська руйнують та знищують архіви приватних осіб. Так окупаційними військами у м. Бучі знищено частину архівних матеріалів українських політв'язнів радянської системи В. Чорновола і М. Плахотнюка: усі книги із колишнього Фонду Чорновола, понад 60 повних комплектів десятитомника Чорновола та особистий архів М. Плахотнюка [18].

Ще одним свідченням про руйнацію архівних фондів є повідомлення Голови Громадської ради при Державному агентстві України з управління зоною відчуження про численні чорнобильські документи та архіви, які були викинуті окупантами у смітник [15].

Ситуація довкола роботи архівних установ України ускладнюється тим, що станом на кінець другого місяця війни з Росією, у зоні бойових дій опинилися державні архіви Запорізької, Миколаївської, Сумської, Харківської, Донецької, Луганської, Чернігівської областей, а Державний архів Херсонської області перебуває в російській окупації [11]. Така ситуація загрожуватиме Україні непоправними втратами національного культурного надбання, а також використанням росіянами архівних документів окупованих територій в ідеологічних та політичних цілях.

Говорячи про втрати, варто згадати також про архівні установи, що опинилися на анексованих і не підконтрольних українській владі територіях після 2014 р. Так, частина архівів Автономної Республіки Крим була ліквідована, а інша – зазнала реорганізації та імплементована у архівну структуру Російської Федерації [6], [5]. Що стосується архівів м. Донецьк та м. Луганськ, то у 2014 р. ці установи без документів були переміщені на територію підконтрольній Україні і продовжили тут свою діяльність. Щодо документних фондів, які залишилися на окупованих територіях, то їх доля невідома [9], [10].

Втрати нівелюються певними здобутками та результатами міжнародної співпраці у сфері архівної діяльності. Укрдержархів, через свою сторінку Facebook, повідомляє про потужну міжнародну підтримку України. Так, наприклад, Archives Portal Europe і Ústav pro

studium totalitních režimů демонструють солідарність із колегами-українцями, підтримують контакти зі співробітниками українських архівних та історичних установ, й крім моральної підтримки, надають особисту допомогу тим, хто опинився у складних життєвих ситуаціях [16], [3].

Про свою цілковиту підтримку України та українського народу заявили Державний архів Хорватії, Ізраїлю, а також Міжнародна спільнота архівістів [2], [4], [12]. Разом з тим, 10 березня 2022 р. Натомість Виконавчий комітет Міжнародної ради архівів вирішили призупинити відносини з державними архівними установами Росії та Білорусі, а рішення вступило в дію негайно [1].

Не зважаючи на складну ситуацію, 14 березня 2022 р., Укрдержархів презентував новий онлайн-проект «Архів архівного законодавства», який пропонує користувачам пошук документів за шістнадцятьма умовно виділеними їх назвами, а також дозволяє критично осмислити їхні положення та висновки, порівняти із сучасною нормативно-правовою базою функціонування архівної галузі [7]. Важливим для збереження архівних фондів України стало підписання Угоди про створення Національним архівом Сполученого Королівства хмарних сховищ даних, резервних копій цифрових матеріалів державних архівних установ України на випадок можливої їх втрати через війну Росії проти України [13]. Укрдержархів та державні архіви, 28 березня 2022 р. підписали договір про співпрацю з корпорацією FamilySearch International (США), метою якого є оцифрування документів Національного архівного фонду України генеалогічного характеру та створення фонду користування на такі документи [17].

Разом з тим, варто відмітити і залучення керівництвом архівних установ простих громадян України до процесу збереження документних фондів. Так, наприклад, мешканців району Оболонь, м. Київ, запрошують допомогти фотографувати документи, а ті у свою чергу, активно беруть у цьому участь [8].

Наразі зусилля Укрдержархіву спрямовані на:

- постійний моніторинг стану галузі та ініціативне документування подій війни;
- точкова взаємопідтримка колег (організація умов дистанційної роботи, тимчасового проживання для тих, хто виїхав тощо);
- переміщення окремих колекцій (де це можливо та безпечно);
- міжнародна взаємодія та підтримка партнерів щодо повної ізоляції країни-агресора;
- розробка механізмів та підписання угод для резервного копіювання цифрових копій архівного фонду та довідкового апарату;
- подальша реалізація онлайн проектів архівною службою та державними архівами;
- методичні рекомендації, консультації щодо ведення діловодства та архівної справи в умовах воєнного стану;
- широкі комунікації зі ЗМІ, колегами з усього світу для організації в майбутньому механізмів міжнародної фінансової та технічної підтримки для відбудови, ремонту та реконструкції архівної інфраструктури [19].

Таким чином, в умовах війни Росії проти України, першочерговим завданням для українських архівістів усіх рівнів стає порятунок архівів від руйнувань та знищень їхніх фондів, адже військова агресія Росії також спрямована на знищення культурної та документальної спадщини України. Архівісти України усіх рівнів намагаються оперативно реагувати на виклики війни. Відзначається також потужна міжнародна підтримка та об'єднання зусиль з Україною, яка виражається у наданні українським архівам безкоштовно на період війни віддалених серверів задля оцифрування документів, підписанні Меморандумів про співпрацю та впровадженні спільних проектів.

Список літератури:

1. Implementation of Executive Board Resolution. International Council on Archives. URL: <https://www.ica.org/en/> (date of access: 25.04.2022).

2. Podrška Državnoj arhivskoj službi Ukrajine. Hrvatski državni arhiv. URL: <http://www.arhiv.hr/hr-hr/Izlozbe-i-dogadjanja/> (datum pristupa: 25.04.2022.).
3. S pocitem bezmoci a zmaru sledujemo násilí páchané Ruskem na Ukrajině / Державна архівна служба України. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/archives.ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
4. Yad Vashem Statement Regarding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Yad Vashem. The World Holocaust Remembrance Center. URL: <https://www.yadvashem.org/press-release/> (date of access: 25.04.2022).
5. Архив города Севастополя : вебсайт. URL: <https://sevarchiv.ru/> (дата обращения: 24.04.2022).
6. Архивы Республики Крым : вебсайт. URL: <https://krymgosarchiv.ru/> (дата обращения: 24.04.2022).
7. Архів архівного законодавства. Державна архівна служба України. URL: https://archives.gov.ua/arch_zakon/ (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
8. Бузко О. Друзі! Хто зараз у Києві, мешкає в районі Оболоні, і має сили і бажання допомогти архіву з фотографуванням документів (наразі на волонтерських засадах) - пишіть мені в особисті повідомлення. Facebook. Oleksandra Buzko. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/sasha.bu.9/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
9. Державний архів Донецької області : вебсайт. URL: <https://dn.archives.gov.ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
10. Державний архів Луганської області : вебсайт. URL: <https://lg.archives.gov.ua/index.html> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
11. Державний архів Херсонської області : вебсайт. URL: <https://kherson.archives.gov.ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
12. Міжнародна спільнота архівістів засуджує агресію Росії та підтримує українських колег. Державна архівна служба України. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/archives.ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
13. Перша Угода про резервне зберігання цифрових копій документів НАФ України у хмарних сховищах іноземних партнерів / Державна архівна служба України. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/archives.ua/posts/343248347844517> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
14. Росіяни знищили архів Служби безпеки на Чернігівщині / Архів національної пам'яті. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/hdauinr/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
15. Сирота О. Це все, що лишилось від наших чорнобильських документів та архівів. Facebook. Oleksandr Syrota. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/aes.planca> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
16. Солідарність з нашими колегами з Центру Досліджень Визвольного Руху та Державної архівної служби України / Державна архівна служба України. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/archives.ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
17. Співробітництво державних архівів з корпорацією FamilySearch International (США) розширюється. Державна архівна служба України. URL: <https://archives.gov.ua/ua/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
18. У Бучі знищена частина архівних матеріалів українських політв'язнів В'ячеслава Чорновола і Миколи Плахотнюка / Архів національної пам'яті. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/hdauinr/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
19. Хромов А. Державна архівна служба України продовжує працювати в умовах війни. Facebook. Anatolii Khromov. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/anatoly.khromov/posts/4920066684697815> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).
20. Хромов А. Наслідки російських бомбардувань у Харкові. Facebook. Anatolii Khromov. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/> (дата звернення: 25.04.2022).

Content

Ailincă A.G. FROM RED TO GREEN ECONOMY - TOWARDS A FREE AND POWERFUL EUROPE ENERGETICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY	4
Berényi Z. THE ISSUE OF SECURITY AND ITS RUSSIAN MISINTERPRETATION	8
Cefaliello D., Giacomo G., Patrone F., Cambiaso E. ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER-ATTACKS EXECUTED DURING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT	12
Chalaris M. WHAT IS THE TERRORIST THREAT IN CYBER-SPACE? IS THIS THREAT LIKELY TO GROW IN THE COMING DECADES?	21
Gečienė J. CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTILITIES ON THE SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF LITHUANIAN REGIONS	24
Gligor R.-C., Pleșa I.-A. CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. ASPECTS REGARDING THE WAR IN UKRAINE	27
Iliev P. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE	31
Ivanov L.L. KISSINGER'S PLAN FOR UKRAINE REVISED	34
Klimenko A.Y. SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR	37
Marenichenko V. DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL UNDER MIGRATION CONDITIONS	40
Nagel H. THE INCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CIVIL DEFENCE ON THE UKRAINIAN EXAMPLE	41
Nagel H. THE COMEBACK OF THE INTERMARIUM?	43
Vacariu O.-A. THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ON UKRAINE'S AGRICULTURE	46
Velika R. WAR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE: CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN	48
Войтович Н.М. СТАНОВИЩЕ ЖІНКИ В УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ ТА РОСІЙСЬКІЙ ТРАДИЦІЙНИХ КУЛЬТУРАХ: ЗВИЧАЙ СНОХАЦТВА	52
Процай А.М., Терещенко К.О. КАХА БЕНДУКІДЗЕ: АНАЛІЗ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ МОДЕЛІ СУЧАСНОЇ УКРАЇНИ	54
Романюк В.Л., Гладка І.А., Гончарова Т.В. НАЦІОНАЛЬНО-ПАТРІОТИЧНЕ ВИХОВАННЯ МАЙБУТНІХ ВЧИТЕЛІВ НА ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТТЯХ З АНГЛІЙСЬКОЇ МОВИ В УМОВАХ ВІЙНИ 2022	56
Хевзюк Т.М., Кондратюк М.М. АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ ЗБЕРЕЖЕННЯ АРХІВНИХ ФОНДІВ В УМОВАХ ВІЙСЬКОВОГО ВТОРГНЕННЯ РОСІЇ В УКРАЇНУ	59